Jill, Roeland, Jaymie and Jordyn Polet v. ESG Security, Inc.
2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 463
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Aug. 13, 2011, the stage at the Indiana State Fair collapsed during a Sugarland concert after high winds; seven people died and many were injured.
- Sugarland’s riders and the State Fair documents allocated security responsibilities to the purchaser/venue; the State Fair engaged ESG Security, Inc. to fulfill security obligations but ESG had no written contract with the Fair.
- ESG personnel performed crowd-control and ticket-checking tasks around the “Sugar Pit”; ESG was not involved in weather-related decisionmaking and did not attend pre-show weather meetings.
- Event officials discussed delaying the show due to approaching storms; Sugarland refused to delay and ESG was not consulted before the decision to proceed; a crowd announcement about possible evacuation was made shortly before the collapse.
- Appellants sued multiple defendants alleging negligence; ESG moved for summary judgment arguing no duty, no breach, and no proximate causation by ESG; the trial court granted ESG summary judgment and final judgment was entered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ESG owed a legal duty to concertgoers with respect to a stage collapse caused by wind | ESG, as the hired security provider, had an assumed duty to protect patrons (citing King) and thus owed care to prevent foreseeable harms | ESG argued King is distinguishable; its contractual role did not include structural safety or weather monitoring and it had no responsibility for stage integrity or weather decisions | Court held no duty: a stage collapse from high wind was not foreseeable as a matter of law and ESG’s scope did not include preventing such a collapse |
| Whether foreseeability of the harm should be analyzed under Webb’s balancing test or the Goodwin/Goldsberry framework | Appellants argued King obviated need for Webb analysis; generally urged duty exists | ESG urged court to apply Webb and limit liability absent foreseeability and policy reasons | Court applied Goodwin (adopting Goldsberry’s distinction) and held foreseeability for duty is a broader-category inquiry; under that test, stage collapse was not foreseeable |
| Whether King (security firm liability for negligent performance of contracted duties) mandates imposing duty here | Appellants relied on King to show a security firm can owe a higher standard and be liable for negligent performance of contractual duties | ESG argued King involved different facts (school setting, contract explicitly required observation against criminal activity) and does not extend to weather/structural collapse | Court distinguished King and refused to extend it to impose duty for a wind-caused stage collapse |
| Whether Appellants raised material factual disputes sufficient to avoid summary judgment | Appellants pointed to expert testimony and ESG activity near the pit to argue questions about ESG’s scope and foreseeability | ESG asserted undisputed facts show no contractual or practical responsibility for stage safety or weather decisions and experts conceded ESG reasonably could expect the stage had been constructed/inspected | Court resolved all reasonable inferences for plaintiffs but concluded as a matter of law that no duty existed; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384 (Ind. 2016) (clarifies that foreseeability can be an element of duty and adopts Goldsberry’s framework distinguishing duty-level foreseeability from proximate-cause foreseeability)
- King v. Northeast Security, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. 2003) (security company may be liable for negligently performing contractually assumed security duties; discussed higher standard for those providing security services)
- Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991) (articulates a three-part balancing test for duty, but Goodwin limits its applicability in duty-foreseeability analysis)
- Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (advocates distinguishing foreseeability inquiry for duty from proximate cause; Goodwin adopts this approach)
- Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999) (example of a fact-intensive foreseeability/proximate-cause analysis; contrasted with broader duty inquiry)