964 N.W.2d 50
Mich. Ct. App.2020Background
- Former General Motors foundry site in Pontiac was leased to USPS; property had known environmental contamination (LNAPLs) and GM retained remediation responsibility under a Master Agreement and access easement.
- USPS built and opened the Metroplex Processing & Distribution Center on the site in 2008; RACER Properties/Trust later became successor to GM’s environmental obligations after GM’s bankruptcy.
- Plaintiffs (USPS employees) alleged exposure since 2015 to methane and VOCs (from LNAPL degradation) at the Metroplex, causing physical and mental symptoms, and sued defendants for negligence and public nuisance.
- Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) early in discovery, arguing no duty to plaintiffs and lack of causation; plaintiffs opposed and sought additional discovery and leave to amend.
- Trial court granted defendants’ (C)(10) motion; Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding defendants owe a duty under the Master Agreement and that causation was improperly resolved prematurely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty of care | Defendants, as assignees of GM’s remediation duties, owed workers a duty to prevent harm from preexisting contamination. | USPS was responsible for working conditions; defendants had no duty for in‑building air/working conditions. | Duty exists: Master Agreement assigned responsibility for remediation of preexisting environmental conditions (carved out from USPS construction responsibility). |
| Causation standard (toxic tort) | General causation evidence of toxins present is enough at (C)(10); expert proof of exposure levels not required at early stage. | Plaintiffs must prove both general and specific causation (including exposure level and expert proof) to avoid summary disposition. | Adopts Lowery concurring framework: plaintiffs must address both general (toxin can cause harm at the alleged dose) and specific causation (exposure more likely than not caused injury); identifying exposure level/dose is necessary. |
| Adequacy of record at summary disposition | Summary disposition was premature because discovery (including expert testing on exposure levels) was not complete; further discovery likely to yield evidence. | Plaintiffs already produced some testing and symptom evidence; record insufficient as a matter of law for causation. | (C)(10) was granted prematurely. Plaintiffs showed independent evidence and a fair likelihood that further discovery (including experts) could support causation. Remand for further discovery. |
| Pleading amendment / nuisance claim | Plaintiffs requested leave to amend if complaint insufficient; preserved public nuisance claim. | Defendants argued nuisance claim waived. | Trial court did not rule on amendment; Court of Appeals reversed and remanded and rejected the waiver argument, leaving amendment/ nuisance issues for the trial court on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 504 Mich 152 (summary disposition (C)(10) standard and evidence viewed in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Hill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 492 Mich 651 (elements of negligence and sources of duty)
- Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich 251 (duty to the public of which plaintiff is a member)
- Skinner v. Square D Co., 445 Mich 153 (factual and proximate causation; circumstantial evidence standards)
- Lowery v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. Partnership, 500 Mich 1034 (Supreme Court order and Justice Markman concurrence on general/specific causation framework adopted)
- Elher v. Misra, 499 Mich 11 (standard for when expert testimony is required vs. within common knowledge)