Jill Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Intercontinental Hotel Group d/b/a Holiday Inn Express
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 668
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Jill Miller slipped and fell on a sidewalk adjacent to the Holiday Inn Express after exiting her parked car on a snowy morning; she had driven her car closer to the carport/sidewalk because she perceived the parking lot as "a little slick."
- Miller testified she observed a dusting of snow before leaving the hotel, heard weather warnings on the radio, canceled a meeting due to treacherous conditions, and moved her car to shorten her walking distance to a salted sidewalk.
- Miller fell while stepping up from the parking area onto the sidewalk/carport area roughly 15–17 feet from her vehicle; she carried coffee and a backpack and wore steel-toe shoes.
- She sued the hotel for negligence, alleging failure to remove ice/snow, warn, inspect, or otherwise make the walkway safe.
- The Hotel moved for summary judgment asserting Miller knew of the dangerous conditions and thus incurred the risk; the trial court granted summary judgment for the Hotel after Miller failed to timely file a response.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding genuine issues of material fact existed about the Hotel's breach and whether Miller voluntarily accepted the risk as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper based on incurred-risk/known-and-obvious-danger defense | Miller: her knowledge was limited to a salted sidewalk she had used; she did not know the sidewalk where she fell was slick or treated, and she attempted to avoid the danger by moving her car | Hotel: Miller knew conditions were slick, canceled travel for safety, moved her car to reduce exposure, and thus appreciated and accepted the risk | Reversed: fact issues exist whether Miller appreciated the specific danger where she fell and whether she voluntarily accepted the risk; summary judgment improper |
| Whether Hotel breached duty as matter of law (failure to discover/treat/warn about hazard) | Miller: Hotel produced no evidence it treated the area where she fell or otherwise exercised reasonable care | Hotel: designated testimony shows Miller appreciated the dangerous conditions so Hotel owed no liability as a matter of law | Reversed: Hotel failed to show no genuine dispute about discovery, treatment, or reasonableness; a jury could find breach |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion denying Miller's motion to correct error (timeliness of her summary judgment response) | Miller: the court should consider her filings and not resolve disputed facts via summary judgment | Hotel: response was untimely and court correctly treated plaintiff’s later-filed motion as not a timely response | Court effectively treated merits and reversed summary judgment; appellate review found trial court erred in granting summary judgment despite disputes of material fact |
| Whether Comparative Fault/ Comparative knowledge alters analysis | Miller: court failed to apply Comparative Fault Act and improperly foreclosed consideration of disputed fault allocation | Hotel: Miller’s awareness of risk supports defense regardless of comparative-fault framing | Court: Comparative Fault Act does not eliminate consideration of a plaintiff’s knowledge for breach/incurred-risk analyses; but here factual disputes remain for jury determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. 2003) (discusses interplay of Restatement §§ 343 and 343A and distinguishes objective landowner knowledge from subjective invitee venturousness)
- Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applies §§ 343 and 343A to icy-condition slip case and holds factual disputes preclude summary judgment)
- Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. 1990) (explains standard for landowner breach and incurred-risk defense; contrasts objective and subjective knowledge)
- Get-N-Go, Inc. v. Markins, 544 N.E.2d 484 (Ind. 1989) (holds that realizing danger only after exposure may not constitute voluntary assumption of risk when escape was not reasonably possible)
- Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 2004) (recites elements of negligence and affirms that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in fact-sensitive negligence actions)