Jill Larson v. Mark Napier, 700 F. App'x 609

On May 23, 2013, Pima County deputies responded to a 911 call from William Warfe reporting an altercation that might have involved a gun; deputies surrounded the Larsons’ home while the Larsons were asleep and ordered them outside.
Deputies handcuffed and searched Jill and Robbin Larson and conducted a warrantless search of their home.
The Larsons sued Sheriff Mark Napier under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by deputies and municipal liability against the Sheriff.
At trial the jury found for the Larsons and awarded damages; the Sheriff appealed but did not contest the underlying constitutional violations.
The appeal challenged (1) denial of the Sheriff’s renewed JMOL motion, (2) refusal to add proposed language to the Ninth Circuit Monell jury instruction, and (3) admission of evidence about Warfe’s prior 911 calls.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Municipal liability under Monell for warrantless seizure/search	Sheriff’s department had a persistent, widespread practice (call‑out/containment) that resulted in seizing people and searching homes before establishing probable cause	No facially unconstitutional policy; plaintiff waived deliberate‑indifference theory; insufficient evidence to show custom/official policy	Affirmed: sufficient evidence of a practice so persistent and widespread as to be municipal policy; jury verdict stands
Jury instruction on Monell	Standard Ninth Circuit instruction correctly states law	Proposed additional language was required	Affirmed: district court did not err; proposed addition unsupported by case law
Admission of prior 911‑call records	Records were relevant to show departmental practice (dispatch/database alerts and tendency to check caller history)	Admission improper because deputies have no constitutional duty to investigate callers	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; evidence showed a department practice and was relevant; Rule 403 exclusion not warranted
Standard for JMOL review	N/A (supports plaintiff verdict)	JMOL should be granted because only one reasonable conclusion exists contrary to jury	Denied: de novo review shows evidence (construed favorably to Larsons) did not permit only one reasonable conclusion contrary to verdict

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability for government policy or custom)
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (definition of official municipal policy and practices that have force of law)
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (JMOL standard in § 1983 context)
Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834 (standard of review for jury instructions; district court’s formulation reviewed for abuse of discretion)
McEuin v. Crown Equipment Corp., 328 F.3d 1028 (appellate review of evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion)
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (official‑capacity suits are suits against the government entity)