Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d 67

William Jewett, Jr. was convicted by a Massachusetts jury in 1998 of rape and first-degree murder based largely on his last-seen-with-victim conduct, the victim’s death around 1:30 A.M., and his jailhouse confession to a fellow inmate.
The victim was a 17-year-old who left a party with Jewett around 12:30–1:00 A.M. after which her body was found later that day; the medical examiner concluded she died from strangulation and that her clothing had been disrupted and redressed at the scene.
DNA/semen evidence showed semen in the victim’s underwear and possibly in the vagina, with analysis inconclusive as to exact timing, and several notes/reports suggested various时间 estimates for prior sexual activity, creating potential inconsistency.
Jewett’s trial defense posited positional asphyxiation during consensual sex, and the defense did not present evidence of prior consensual intercourse with the victim.
On post-trial state motions, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) addressed claims that hearsay notes about sperm age and other improper physician testimony were ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issues, ultimately denying relief on the merits.
Jewett petitioned for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising three ineffective-assistance claims (two on appellate counsel, one on trial counsel) and challenging the gatekeeper’s handling under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Appellate counsel’s effectiveness re juror-bias claim	Jewett argues appellate counsel should have raised juror-bias objections.	Brady contends the juror claim was meritless and a strategic omission was reasonable.	Likely reasonable strategy; no ineffectiveness established.
Appellate counsel’s effectiveness re physician testimony	Jewett contends appellate counsel should have argued trial counsel erred in not objecting to improper physician testimony on rape.	Brady asserts the evidence, though improper, did not create a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and was not dispositive.	SJC and district court reasonable; no prejudice shown.
Trial counsel effectiveness re sperm-age notes	Jewett claims trial counsel failed to present the sperm-age evidence to impeach the chemist and advance alternate theories.	Brady asserts the notes were inconsistent and did not impeach the chemist; no plausible alternate theory was shown by Jewett.	Reasonable determination; no deficient performance or prejudice.
Procedural default under section 33E	Gatekeeper’s denial cannot bar review of ineffective-assistance claims that were unraised on direct appeal.	Section 33E grounds default if not 'new' and 'substantial'; the gatekeeper’s ruling precludes federal review.	Court reached merits; no independent default requiring relief.

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (doubles deferential standard for § 2254(d) review of Strickland claims)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (deficient performance plus prejudice standard)
Saferian v. Commonwealth, 315 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. 1974) (functional equivalent of Strickland in Massachusetts)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (clarifies deference in Strickland analysis)
Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (prescribes standards for AEDPA review of state-court findings)
Dickerson v. Latessa, 872 F.2d 1116 (1st Cir. 1989) (Mass. §33E plenary review integration with post-conviction matters)
Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999) (gatekeeper determination on newness of issues within §33E)
Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) (independent and adequate state-ground doctrine scope)