561 F.Supp.3d 1082
E.D. Wash.2021Background
- Governor Inslee issued a series of COVID-19 proclamations (beginning March 18, 2020) imposing a temporary statewide eviction moratorium to limit transmission and avert mass homelessness; later replaced/transited into a "Bridge" Proclamation pending implementation of SB 5160 programs.
- SB 5160 (2021) created rental-assistance and eviction-resolution pilot programs and defined a "reasonable repayment plan;" the Bridge Proclamation conditions certain evictions on those plans and program availability.
- Plaintiffs are Yakima-area landlords/property managers with substantial unpaid rent claims who did not use local SB 5160 programs and sued state officials alleging Contracts Clause, Takings Clause (state and federal), and Due Process violations.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; at hearing the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, granted Defendants’, and dismissed the governor under Ex Parte Young/Eleventh Amendment principles.
- The court held (inter alia) the moratorium: is not a substantial impairment under the Contracts Clause; is not a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment; and is not unconstitutionally vague nor a substantive due process violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness / Standing | Moratorium cessation of Proclamation 20-19.6 moots claims only if Bridge Proclamation does not continue impairing rights; injury traceable to state moratorium. | Bridge Proclamation continues restrictions; federal moratorium ended so state moratorium causes injury. | Not moot; Bridge Proclamation sustains live controversy; Plaintiffs have standing tied to state moratorium. |
| Eleventh Amendment / Ex Parte Young | Governor can be sued because state constitution makes him responsible to ‘‘see laws faithfully executed.’’ | Sovereign immunity bars suit against governor absent a fairly direct enforcement connection. | Governor dismissed: generalized enforcement duty insufficient; Attorney General remains proper defendant. |
| Contracts Clause | Moratorium substantially impairs leases by removing cornerstone remedy (eviction) and is not sufficiently tailored. | Moratorium is a temporary restraint, does not extinguish obligations, and is a reasonable emergency measure (Blaisdell line). | No substantial impairment; even if impairment existed, the moratorium is an appropriate, reasonable response to legitimate public interests. |
| Takings Clause / Declaratory relief | Moratorium effects per se physical taking (right to exclude; interference with contracts and security deposits); asks for declaratory finding to pursue compensation. | No physical occupation or appropriation; Cedar Point distinguishable; takings remedy is damages, not equitable relief (Knick). | Declaratory/injunctive relief unavailable for alleged taking; moratorium is not a per se physical taking under Loretto/Yee/Cedar Point analysis. |
| Due Process — Vagueness | Terms (e.g., "reasonable repayment plan") are too vague to guide landlords. | Void-for-vagueness applies mainly to prohibitions with penalties; Bridge/SB 5160 provide substantive guidance and examples. | Not unconstitutionally vague as applied or facially; Bridge/SB5160 and AG materials give meaningful guidance. |
| Due Process — Substantive | Moratorium unduly oppressive and arbitrary in regulating economic use of property. | Economic regulation governed by rational-basis review; moratorium furthers legitimate public-health and housing interests. | Substantive due process claim fails (Contracts Clause provides explicit textual protection; moratorium is rationally related to legitimate objectives). |
Key Cases Cited
- Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (upheld emergency mortgage moratorium and recognized police-power emergency exception to strict Contracts Clause limits)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (permanent physical occupation is a per se taking)
- Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (landlord-tenant regulation is not a per se physical taking where owners voluntarily invited occupancy)
- Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (access regulation that appropriates right to exclude can be a per se physical taking)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (regulatory takings multi-factor balancing approach)
- Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162 (takings remedy is money damages; equitable relief generally unavailable)
- Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (distinction between physical and regulatory takings)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (clarified takings and substantive due process frameworks)
- Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (articulated Contracts Clause two-step inquiry)
- Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (deference to legislative judgment when government not a contracting party)