Jesus Ruben Molina v. Elias Alvarado
463 S.W.3d 867
| Tex. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Elias Alvarado sued the City of McCamey for negligence after a city vehicle driven by employee Jesus Molina allegedly struck his car; initial petition named only the City.
- The City asserted governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) and Molina later was added as a defendant in an amended petition that alternatively alleged Molina could be individually liable if he was not furthering governmental affairs.
- Molina moved for summary judgment under TTCA § 101.106(a), arguing Alvarado’s earlier suit against the City barred subsequent suit against Molina individually (an election of remedies issue).
- The trial court denied Molina’s motion; the court of appeals affirmed, holding subsection (a) bars suit against an employee only when sued in his official capacity and that factual disputes about scope of employment precluded summary judgment.
- The Texas Supreme Court reviewed whether Alvarado’s initial suit against the City constituted an irrevocable election barring later individual-capacity claims against Molina, regardless of factual disputes about scope of employment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing suit against the governmental unit bars later suit against the employee under TTCA § 101.106(a) | Alvarado: amended complaint alleging individual liability means Molina can be sued personally if he was outside scope of employment | Molina: initial suit against City was an irrevocable election under §101.106(a), barring later suit against him individually | Court held the initial suit against the City irrevocably barred later suit against Molina individually under §101.106(a) |
| Whether factual disputes about scope of employment defeat summary judgment on §101.106(a) effect | Alvarado: existence of material fact issues (e.g., intoxication, scope) prevents dismissal of Molina | Molina: scope-of-employment disputes are irrelevant because plaintiff already elected to sue the governmental unit | Court held scope-of-employment disputes irrelevant to the election question once plaintiff sued the governmental unit first |
| Whether §101.106(f) permits substitution or revival of employee claims after suing the governmental unit | Alvarado: §101.106(f) allows plaintiffs a window to amend or clarify capacity sued | Molina: §101.106(f) only helps plaintiffs who initially sue an employee; it does not allow revival after suing the governmental unit | Court held §101.106(f) does not allow a plaintiff who sued the unit first to later pursue individual-capacity claims against the employee |
| Proper remedy on appeal where §101.106(a) bars subsequent individual-capacity suit | Alvarado: proceed to resolve factual issues about employment scope | Molina: render judgment dismissing Molina from suit | Court rendered judgment for Molina, reversing the court of appeals |
Key Cases Cited
- Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (summarizes official-capacity vs. individual-capacity liability and official immunity principles)
- Tex. Adjutant Gen.'s Office v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. 2013) (explains §101.106(f) and the window to substitute the governmental unit when an employee is sued for conduct within scope)
- Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2014) (clarifies that a suit "against any individual employee" means one seeking personal liability)
- Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008) (discusses the election-of-remedies consequences and the care plaintiffs must take in choosing defendants)