Jesus Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 966 F.3d 934

The City of Los Angeles charges a $63 parking fine for overstaying metered time; a $63 late fee is added if unpaid after 21 days, plus subsequent fees, producing total potential penalties up to $181.
Plaintiffs (including Jesus Pimentel) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the fines and late fees violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause (and the California Constitution).
The district court granted summary judgment for the City, holding the fines and late fee were not "grossly disproportional." Plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and considered whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines and whether the particular fines are excessive under the Bajakajian framework.
The panel held the Excessive Fines Clause applies to state and local fines (Timbs), affirmed that the $63 initial fine is not grossly disproportional, but reversed and remanded as to the $63 late-payment penalty because the district court did not apply the proper analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause apply to municipal parking fines?	Excessive Fines Clause constrains state and local fines, including municipal parking fines.	Historically applied to criminal forfeitures only; municipal parking charges are not subject to the Clause.	Clause applies to state and local (municipal) fines (Timbs governs incorporation).
Is the $63 initial parking fine grossly disproportionate to the offense?	$63 is excessive for a minor parking overstay; court should consider ability to pay.	$63 bears a relationship to the offense, serves deterrence, and is within legislative authority.	Affirmed: $63 is not grossly disproportional under Bajakajian factors.
Is the $63 late-payment penalty (after 21 days) grossly disproportionate?	The identical $63 late fee doubles the punitive burden and may be excessive.	City did not meaningfully defend the late fee on appeal.	Reversed and remanded for Bajakajian analysis of the late fee; district court erred by failing to analyze it.
Must courts require means-testing (ability to pay) under the Excessive Fines Clause?	Courts should account for defendant’s ability to pay when assessing excessiveness.	No established means-testing requirement; Bajakajian and Timbs left the question open.	Court declined to adopt a general means-testing requirement on these facts.

United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (establishes "grossly disproportional" standard and factors for Excessive Fines analysis)
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (incorporates Excessive Fines Clause against the states via Fourteenth Amendment)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (characterizes the Excessive Fines Clause as limiting government power to extract payments as punishment)
United States v. $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2004) (applies Bajakajian factors to civil penalties)
Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholds municipal deterrent fines as not grossly disproportionate)
Vasudeva v. United States, 214 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (applies Excessive Fines analysis to civil monetary penalties)
United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2003) (explains flexibility of Bajakajian and consideration of culpability and harm)