Jesus Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 115 F.4th 1062

Background

Los Angeles charges a $63 parking fine for expired meters; if unpaid after 21 days, a $63 late fee (100% of original fine) is imposed.
Plaintiffs incurred citations and challenged both fines as excessive under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause via a class action.
The Ninth Circuit previously upheld the initial $63 fine (Pimentel I), but remanded for further consideration of whether the $63 late fee was excessive.
On remand, plaintiffs presented unrebutted testimony suggesting the late fee was set arbitrarily to raise revenue, not to ensure compliance or reflect harm.
The City provided no explanation or evidence for how it set the late fee amount. The district court granted summary judgment to the City; plaintiffs appealed again.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the $63 late fee unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause?	The late fee is arbitrary, set solely to raise revenue, and grossly disproportional to the harm of a late payment.	The fee is not grossly disproportionate; monetary penalties deter and fund enforcement; courts should defer to city policy.	Genuine factual dispute exists; summary judgment for City reversed and remanded; City failed to justify the late fee.
Must the City provide evidence justifying the amount of the late fee?	Yes; absent evidence, the fee cannot be presumed proportional or for a legitimate purpose.	No; legislative deference suffices unless plaintiffs show contrary evidence; revenue generation is not improper.	City must provide some evidence; deference is not warranted without an evidentiary basis.
Does motivation (revenue-raising vs compliance) matter for proportionality of fines?	Motivation highlights arbitrariness, showing no tie to the harm caused or legitimate government interest.	Courts should not inquire into legislative motives; only proportionality matters, and all fines raise revenue.	Motivation per se not dispositive; but lack of evidence that fee ties to harm precludes summary judgment.
Should means-testing (ability to pay) factor into Excessive Fines analysis?	Yes; inability to pay amplifies excessiveness and hardship caused by fines.	No; the Constitution does not require means-testing for civil fines outside in rem forfeiture.	Means-testing not incorporated; court declines to extend it beyond in rem forfeitures.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (Supreme Court's principal case on "gross disproportionality" under the Excessive Fines Clause)
Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (Incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause against the states and articulated history/importance)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (Clarified that the Clause applies to punitive, not purely remedial, penalties)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (Discussed the historical basis for the Excessive Fines Clause)
Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619 (Eighth Amendment excessive fine analysis for municipal fines)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (Articulated judicial deference to legislative judgments on punishment)