Jesus Ortiz v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 71A03-1704-PC-820

Ortiz was convicted at trial of two counts of child molesting (class A felonies) and sentenced to an aggregate 60 years; direct appeal affirmed his convictions; Ortiz later sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Brady violation, and other grounds; post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied relief; Ortiz argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise/plead issues on direct appeal and for mismanaging the record; the court discusses Strickland v. Washington and related Indiana precedents to evaluate prejudice and performance; the court addresses whether a bifurcated PCR proceeding was agreed upon and whether prejudice was shown under the Strickland standard; the court ultimately affirms denial of post-conviction relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Ortiz’s appellate counsel ineffective on direct appeal?	Ortiz claims Zirkle’s handling of the direct appeal was deficient and prejudicial.	The post-conviction court found no prejudice and did not clearly err in evaluating counsel’s effectiveness.	No, appellate counsel was not ineffective.
Did the PCR court err by relying on an alleged bifurcation agreement to separate Strickland prongs?	Ortiz contends the hearing was bifurcated to address competence first and prejudice later.	Record shows no clear bifurcation agreement; statements are ambiguous.	No reversible error; no proven bifurcation agreement.
Did Ortiz show prejudice under the Strickland test for appellate counsel’s performance?	But-for counsel’s deficiencies, the outcome of the direct appeal would have been different.	Even assuming deficient performance, Ortiz failed to show a reasonable probability the outcome would differ.	Ortiz failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Did Middleton v. State modify the standard for showing prejudice in post-conviction appeals?	Ortiz argues a stricter standard should apply.	Prejudice requires a reasonable probability of a different result; standard remains intact.	Prejudice requires probability of a different outcome; Ortiz failed to meet it.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Middleton v. State, 72 N.E.3d 891 (Ind. 2017) ( clarifies prejudice standard in post-conviction proceedings)
Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. 2000) (explains bifurcated post-conviction approach for appellate vs. trial counsel issues)
Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. 2013) (separately require two prongs of Strickland for both trial and appellate counsel)
Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. 2008) (affords deference to counsel; strong presumption of effectiveness)
Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939 (Ind. 2008) (electing direct appeal vs. PCR for ineffective-assistance claims)