Jessica L. Tafoya v. Paul W. Tafoya
2013 WY 121
Wyo.2013Background
- Parents divorced in 2012; father (Wyoming) awarded primary residential custody, mother (New Mexico) given "liberal visitation" with the court's Standard Visitation Order incorporated into the decree.
- The incorporated Standard Visitation Order treats weekend transportation costs as borne by the visiting parent, but treats summer/holiday transportation costs as split equally.
- The body of the divorce decree, however, stated more generally that visitation transportation costs were to be shared, creating a conflict with the incorporated Standard Visitation Order.
- Five months after the decree, father moved to correct/clarify the decree because mother insisted on cost-sharing for weekend visits, forcing father to incur significant travel expense.
- The subsequent district court judge (not the trial judge) granted the motion under W.R.C.P. 60(a), clarifying that the Standard Visitation Order governs: weekend costs are the visiting parent's responsibility; other visitation costs are shared.
- Mother appealed, arguing the district court exceeded Rule 60(a) authority and impermissibly modified the decree without a Rule 59(e) or change-of-circumstances showing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tafoya — Mother) | Defendant's Argument (Tafoya — Father) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(a) could be used to correct/clarify the inconsistent transportation provisions | Rule 60(a) is limited to mechanical/clerical errors; the decree language was the product of deliberate judicial action and cannot be corrected under Rule 60(a) | The discrepancy between the decree body and the incorporated Standard Visitation Order created a patent ambiguity that Rule 60(a) can correct to effectuate the court's intent | Court held Rule 60(a) applies to clarify the patent ambiguity and correct what amounts to a clerical mistake |
| Whether the district court’s clarification impermissibly modified the decree (requiring Rule 59(e) or change-of-circumstances) | The order altered substantive rights re allocation of costs and therefore required a motion to alter/amend or a modification showing | The district court merely clarified the decree to reflect the trial court’s contemporaneous intent as expressed at the hearing, not a substantive change | Court held the order was a permissible clarification reflecting the trial court’s intent, not an improper modification |
| Proper method to resolve ambiguity when trial judge is unavailable | Ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter (father’s counsel) or require formal amendment procedures | Court may consider the trial court’s oral ruling and surrounding circumstances to ascertain contemporaneous intent | Court considered oral ruling and surrounding context and found the district court’s interpretation reasonable and correct |
| Standard for construing ambiguous court orders | Mother urged strict textualism favoring decree text over incorporated form | Father and court applied contract-construction principles, looking at context and trial court oral statements | Court applied contract/order construction rules and contemporaneous intent as the controlling guide |
Key Cases Cited
- Glover v. Crayk, 122 P.3d 955 (Wyo. 2005) (describing two-step Rule 60(a) review and that clarifications can correct clerical mistakes)
- Wyland v. Wyland, 138 P.3d 1165 (Wyo. 2006) (treating clarifications under Rule 60(a) as appropriate to resolve ambiguities)
- Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P.2d 1146 (Wyo. 1978) (Rule 60(a) may be used to clarify as well as correct to effectuate court intent)
- Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104 (Wyo. 1996) (contract-construction approach applied to court orders)
- Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., 65 P.3d 703 (Wyo. 2003) (ambiguity is a question of law; courts may consider surrounding circumstances to ascertain intent)