Jessica Barefield v. Jacqueline Hillman, 20-6002

Background

T.H., a juvenile with a history of running away and gang associations, was adjudicated delinquent and placed in Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (DCS) custody in Oct. 2016.
DCS placed T.H. in progressively more secure placements (two foster homes, then Volunteer Youth Academy (VYA), a Level 3 facility). He escaped VYA on Apr. 10, 2017; a week later his mother Jessica Barefield located him and police returned him to custody.
No Level 3 bed was immediately available, so DCS temporarily placed T.H. in David Welbeck’s traditional Level 1 foster home until May 17, 2017; when DCS workers arrived to transfer him to Deer Valley (a higher-security facility), T.H. ran away.
On June 9, 2017, T.H. was found shot to death; Barefield sues DCS employees (including Hillman and Normant) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting substantive due‑process claims, including a state-created-danger theory (Claim IV).
The district court denied qualified immunity on Claim IV; Hillman and Normant appealed, conceding the second and third prongs of the state-created-danger test and limiting the appeal to whether their placement decision was an “affirmative act” that created/increased risk.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether placing T.H. in a Level 1 foster home (Welbeck) instead of a Level 3 facility was an “affirmative act” that created or increased risk of third‑party violence under the state‑created‑danger doctrine	Barefield: placement in an inadequately secure foster home increased T.H.’s risk of gang violence; state had heightened duty to protect foster children	Hillman/Normant: proper comparison is to T.H.’s pre‑intervention position (with mother or at large); he was not safer before state action, so placement did not increase risk	Court: No. The proper comparison is to the pre‑state position; T.H. was not safer before state custody or while at large, so no affirmative act created/increased risk; qualified immunity reversed at district court, but on review defendants entitled to immunity (district court denial reversed)
Alternate theory: placement at Welbeck made T.H. more likely to run away (by being more comfortable) and thus more likely to be harmed	Barefield: temporary placement increased comfort and likelihood of future escape and harm	Hillman/Normant: even if he could run away from Welbeck, he was also able to run away before placement; thus no increased risk compared to pre‑intervention status	Court: Rejected for the same reason—no increase in risk relative to pre‑state condition

Key Cases Cited

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Due Process Clause does not impose a general duty to protect individuals from private violence; liability only in special‑relationship or similar affirmative‑act contexts)
Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (state‑created‑danger inquiry compares victim’s safety before state action to safety after it)
Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2020) (sets elements of state‑created‑danger claim)
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998) (describes affirmative‑act basis for liability where state creates or increases risk from third parties)
Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1995) (state may be liable for placing child in a foster home it knows cannot adequately supervise—but treated as special‑relationship context by other circuits)
Meador v. Cabinet for Hum. Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990) (state liable under special‑relationship theory for placing child in abusive foster home)
Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304 (6th Cir. 1994) (same)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity framework: plaintiff must show violation of a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity governing standard)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity limited to legal issues)
Rafferty v. Trumbull County, 915 F.3d 1087 (6th Cir. 2019) (standard of review for interlocutory denial of qualified immunity)
Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2006) (if no constitutional violation, court need not reach whether right was clearly established)