972 N.W.2d 686
Iowa2022Background
- Jesse Vroegh, a transgender man employed by the Iowa Department of Corrections, began transitioning at work and requested access to the men’s restrooms/locker rooms; the State limited him to single-stall unisex restrooms instead.
- Vroegh sought insurance coverage under the State’s self-funded Blue Access plan (administered by Wellmark) for double mastectomy (“top surgery”); the plan contained exclusions for "gender identity" disorders and a 2015 clarification expressly excluding “gender reassignment surgery.”
- Vroegh sued the State agencies, an agency official, and Wellmark asserting sex discrimination and gender identity discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act; Wellmark moved for summary judgment and was dismissed below; claims against the State proceeded to jury trial.
- The jury found for Vroegh on both sex and gender-identity discrimination claims (awarding $100,000 for restroom claims and $20,000 for benefits claims) and the district court awarded statutory attorney fees; the State appealed and Vroegh cross-appealed Wellmark’s dismissal.
- The jury asked for definitions of “sex” and “gender identity” during deliberations; the court’s answer was criticized on appeal as confusing and possibly conflating the two grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury should have been instructed on a business-judgment rule defense | Vroegh: State’s justifications were pretextual and thus no business-judgment instruction warranted | State: Jury should be told it cannot second-guess reasonable, nondiscriminatory business decisions | Court: No error refusing instruction—State failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (appeasement of coworkers/acquiescence insufficient) |
| Whether the same-decision affirmative defense should have been submitted | Vroegh: State failed to plead the defense and presented no nondiscriminatory basis | State: Could have shown it would have made same decision absent protected characteristic | Held: No instruction required—State gave no nondiscriminatory basis to support the defense |
| Admissibility of (a) Vroegh’s later termination and (b) post-termination vindictive statements as impeachment/relevance to damages | Vroegh: These matters are collateral or unduly prejudicial and not probative of discriminatory acts or emotional distress from those acts | State: Termination impeachment shows untruthfulness; statements show motive/vengeance, undermining distress claims | Held: No abuse of discretion excluding them—remote in time, low probative value, high prejudicial risk, and not tied to alleged discrimination |
| Liability of Wellmark (summary judgment) and mootness of Vroegh’s cross-appeal | Vroegh: Wellmark participated in plan design/administration, acted as agent or aider/abettor, so liable; appeal not moot because he seeks attorneys’ fees tied to Wellmark claims | Wellmark: Independent contractor/administrator with no authority to set plan terms; earlier judgment against State satisfies claims and moots appeal | Held: Affirmed summary judgment—Wellmark was an independent administrator (not a controlling agent or aider/abettor) and Vroegh’s appeal is not moot solely because fee recovery could be affected (plaintiff may pursue fees tied to dismissed defendant) |
| Whether "sex" in Iowa Civil Rights Act covers transgender status (distinct from "gender identity") | Vroegh: Bostock reasoning supports construing "sex" to include transgender status; duplicative statutory protection unnecessary | State: Sommers controls; "sex" denotes biological male/female and Iowa separately protects "gender identity"; jury should not have been given sex claim | Held: Followed Sommers—"sex" and "gender identity" are distinct; reversed and dismissed jury verdicts on sex-discrimination claims but affirmed gender-identity verdicts and damages (no prejudice shown) |
Key Cases Cited
- Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (held "sex" refers to anatomical male/female and does not encompass transsexual status)
- Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020) (Title VII holds an employer violates law when it treats employees differently because they are transgender)
- Woodbury Cnty. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 335 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1983) (business-judgment instruction requires reasonably articulated nondiscriminatory reason)
- Sahai v. Davies, 557 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1997) (advisory third parties generally not liable under ICRA when acting as independent advisors)
- Tovar v. Essentia Health, 857 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2017) (third-party administrator may be liable if it provided a discriminatory plan document that caused injury)
- Rumsey v. Woodgrain Millwork, Inc., 962 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 2021) (individuals personally involved and able to effectuate adverse employment actions may be liable under ICRA)
- Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1975) (statutory civil-rights protections cannot be waived by contract or collective bargaining)
- Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1994) (elements of aiding-and-abetting require knowledge and substantial assistance)