Jerzy Gruca, V Nylund Homes, Inc.
50349-2
| Wash. Ct. App. | Oct 31, 2017Background
- Gruca purchased Clark County property in 1993 and later obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust; MERS was named beneficiary and later assigned the deed to The Bank of New York Mellon.
- The borrower defaulted; a successor trustee held a nonjudicial trustee’s sale on May 20, 2016, at which Nylund Homes purchased the property and recorded a trustee’s deed reciting compliance with the Deeds of Trust Act.
- Nylund Homes filed an unlawful detainer action on June 13, 2016; the superior court granted an immediate writ of restitution and the sheriff executed it; Gruca vacated but left a portable storage unit and other personal property.
- Nylund Homes boxed and moved Gruca’s belongings to a storage facility, notified him of intent to sell/dispose after 30 days, and sought an order authorizing disposition and recovery of labor/storage costs.
- Gruca challenged the writ and disposal order, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of alleged defects in title and asserting statutory limits on disposal procedures and storage placement.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: superior court had jurisdiction to issue writ of restitution and it could authorize a procedure for disposal of property; RCW 59.18.312 (landlord-tenant disposal statute) does not control post-trustee-sale disposals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Nylund) | Defendant's Argument (Gruca) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over unlawful detainer because RCW 59.12.032 compliance must be first determined | Superior court has constitutional jurisdiction over possession disputes; statutory compliance is procedural, not jurisdictional | Court must first determine compliance with RCW 61.24.040/.060 per RCW 59.12.032 before exercising jurisdiction | Court held compliance questions are procedural; superior court had subject-matter jurisdiction and Gruca waived procedural challenges not raised below |
| Whether alleged title/foreclosure defects defeat unlawful detainer writ | Nylund: trustee’s deed recitals provide prima facie compliance; title defects must be litigated in separate actions per Deeds of Trust Act | Gruca: defective title, improper MERS assignment, invalid foreclosure mean writ is void | Court held title defects are not a proper defense in unlawful detainer; remedies for defective foreclosure lie under Deeds of Trust Act, so writ stands |
| Whether RCW 59.18.312 (landlord-tenant disposal) applies to purchaser after trustee’s sale | Nylund: statute applies to landlord-tenant only; purchaser may seek court-authorized procedure | Gruca: purchaser must follow RCW 59.18.312 when disposing of property and cannot impose costs | Court held RCW 59.18.312 does not control disposals after trustee’s sale; trial court may authorize disposal procedures and award costs |
| Whether purchaser was required to store property on-site (Gruca’s portable unit) instead of off-site and thus cannot recover storage costs | Nylund: permitted to move to off-site storage and recover reasonable costs under court order | Gruca: placing a storage container constituted an objection under RCW 59.18.312, so property should have been left on public property, not stored off-site; costs not recoverable | Court rejected statutory-storage argument (statute inapplicable) and affirmed award of storage/labor costs to Nylund |
Key Cases Cited
- Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365 (Washington 2007) (unlawful detainer is an expedited statutory proceeding limited to possession issues)
- Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wn.2d 564 (Washington 1983) (superior court sits in a limited statutory capacity in unlawful detainer matters)
- River Stone Holdings NW, LLC v. Lopez, 199 Wn. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App.) (title defects are not a defense in unlawful detainer; Deeds of Trust Act procedures control)
- Excelsior Mortg. Equity Fund II, LLC v. Schroeder, 171 Wn. App. 333 (Wash. Ct. App.) (trial court may authorize purchaser to use a procedure for disposing of property after writ without strictly invoking chapter 59.18)
- Fannie Mae v. Steinmann, 181 Wn.2d 753 (Washington 2014) (attorney-fee provisions for landlords do not apply to purchasers after trustee’s sale because no landlord-tenant relationship)
- MHM&F, LLC v. Pryor, 168 Wn. App. 451 (Wash. Ct. App.) (statutory compliance issues are distinct from constitutional grant of superior court jurisdiction)
- Angelo Prop. Co., LP v. Hafiz, 167 Wn. App. 789 (Wash. Ct. App.) (distinguishing scope of superior court jurisdiction in unlawful detainer contexts)