Jerry Rudd v. Commissioner of Social Security
531 F. App'x 719
6th Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiff Jerry T. Rudd applied for DIB and SSI; prior ALJ (2007) found RFC limited to a reduced range of sedentary, unskilled work but not disabled. Rudd’s insured status ended December 31, 2008.
- Rudd filed new claims in October 2007; medical records 2007–2009 show conservative treatment for intermittent orthopedic pain, largely normal 2008 x-rays of hands and lumbar spine, and improved mental-health treatment response (GAF ~55–60) while medicated.
- Treating-office notes were sparse (four visits 2007–2008); a 2009 questionnaire from Dr. Butler indicated very restrictive limitations but was not supported by detailed treating records.
- Non-examining state physicians and an ALJ-appointed psychologist (Dr. Wagner) found Rudd could perform at least simple work with moderate nonexertional limits; a consultative psychologist (Dr. Amble) opined more severe limitations after a single exam.
- ALJ concluded Rudd’s condition had improved since the prior decision (Drummond issue), found an RFC for light work with specified mental limitations, held Rudd could perform past work as a cook (alternative step‑5 finding), and denied benefits. District court affirmed; Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ was bound by prior ALJ's RFC (res judicata/Drummond) | Rudd: prior RFC should bind unless explicit comparative findings show change absent improvement evidence | Commissioner: record after prior decision shows improved orthopedic and mental status; ALJ may reevaluate RFC | Held: ALJ permissibly found changed circumstances and was not bound by prior RFC (Drummond satisfied) |
| Whether physical RFC for light work is supported | Rudd: no physician opined he can meet light-work standing/walking requirements; treating evidence supports greater limits | Commissioner: objective tests, conservative treatment, normal x-rays, and medical reviewers support less restrictive RFC; ALJ may assess RFC | Held: Substantial evidence supports ALJ’s light‑work RFC despite contrary opinions |
| Weight accorded treating/examining opinions (Dr. Butler, Dr. Amble) | Rudd: ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Butler and Dr. Amble; should apply treating‑physician factors | Commissioner: Dr. Butler not a treating source here; Dr. Amble was a one‑time examiner whose opinion conflicted with record; ALJ reasonably weighed opinions | Held: ALJ properly discounted extreme limitations; did not err in weighing opinions |
| Adequacy of RFC articulation / VE hypotheticals (SSR 96‑8p and breaks) | Rudd: ALJ failed function‑by‑function analysis and omitted explicit two‑hour breaks in VE hypotheticals; prior neuropsych evidence overlooked | Commissioner: ALJ specified exertional and nonexertional limits per SSR 96‑8p; two‑hour breaks are assumed in typical jobs; ALJ considered prior evidence and relied on VE for RFC used | Held: RFC and VE hypotheticals adequate; omission of explicit break language harmless; ALJ implicitly considered the record as whole |
Key Cases Cited
- Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997) (subsequent ALJ bound by prior ALJ absent new evidence of change)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court 1971) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2012) (Commissioner’s decision upheld if supported by substantial evidence even if contrary evidence exists)
- Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1994) (non‑examining opinion may be relied on when supported by record)
- Maziarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1987) (ALJ need not rely on VE testimony premised on limitations the ALJ rejects)
- Ross v. Gardner, 365 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1966) (ALJ may not substitute independent medical research for record evidence)