Jerry May, Perry May, David May, Vernell May Espa, and Irma May Taylor v. cooper/t. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc., 2024-CA-0272

This case concerns wrongful death and survival claims by the heirs and siblings of Monroe Wade May, who died of mesothelioma allegedly contracted from asbestos exposure while working as a stevedore in the 1960s–1970s.
Plaintiffs sued Louisiana Stevedores' insurers, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA), after one insurer, ENIC, became insolvent and LIGA assumed its obligations.
The core dispute involves whether certain employer liability insurance policies provided coverage, or whether coverage was excluded by a "36-month exclusion" barring disease claims filed more than 36 months after the policy expired.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants (Liberty and LIGA), denying coverage, and denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the policy language is ambiguous and that defendants did not provide primary evidence of the actual policies or exclusions.

Issue	Plaintiffs' Argument	Defendants' Argument	Held
1. Existence of Exclusion (e) in policies	Defendants failed to submit the actual policies or primary evidence of the exclusion; only secondary evidence was provided.	Plaintiffs waived this issue by not raising it below or contesting policy content; standard policies always included the exclusion.	For plaintiffs: Defendants failed to carry burden to prove exclusion was in the policies.
2. Ambiguity of "Bodily Injury by Accident/Disease" in Definition (c)	Policy definitions are ambiguous—plaintiffs' asbestos disease could be accidental; ambiguity should be construed in favor of coverage.	Coverage unambiguously excluded; precedent shows asbestos diseases are not “by accident.”	For plaintiffs: Language is ambiguous, ambiguity construed for coverage.
3. Application of Precedent (Faciane & others)	Faciane supports ambiguity in the policy language for occupational diseases; summary judgment for defendants inappropriate.	Later cases (e.g. Hubbs, Hayes) found no ambiguity—claims barred.	For plaintiffs: Faciane is controlling because later cases did not address classification ambiguity directly.
4. Application of 36-Month Exclusion	Time bar shouldn't apply due to ambiguity or lack of proof of exclusion's presence in policy.	Exclusion applies, so the claim filed decades after policy expiration is untimely.	For plaintiffs: Ambiguity and failure to prove exclusion defeat application of time bar.

Faciane v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 446 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1984) (held that ambiguity existed between "bodily injury by disease" and "by accident," precluding summary judgment)
Hayes v. Eagle, Inc., 876 So.2d 108 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2004) (enforced the 36-month exclusion; distinguished here for not addressing ambiguity directly)
Hubbs v. Anco Insulations, 747 So.2d 804 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1999) (held that asbestosis was not a "bodily injury by accident," exclusion applied; not followed here)
Ehlers v. Ports America Gulfport, Inc., 401 So.3d 159 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2024) (held that insurer must present primary evidence of the exclusion's presence)