Jerry Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13856
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Plaintiff Markadonatos was arrested for shoplifting in Woodridge, IL, paid a $30 booking fee at booking, and was released after posting bond.
- He subsequently pled guilty, received court supervision, paid additional court costs, and moved to recover the $30 fee through a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action.
- Woodridge Ordinance 5-1-12(A) imposed a $30 booking fee when posting bail/bond or during custodial arrest, later repealed before the en banc decision.
- District court dismissed on pleadings; panel affirmed a split decision; en banc granted and oral argument held.
- Judge Posner (with Flaum and Kanne) interpreted the fee as limited to bail/bond context; Judge Hamilton dissented; Judge Sykes and others debated standing and due process.
- The court ultimately interpreted the booking fee as applicable only to bail/bond situations, held the suit as pleadable but subject to dismissal on the merits, and remanded/affirmed consistent with that interpretation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the booking fee violate due process as applied to arrestees? | Markadonatos argues the fee is an unconstitutional burden for being arrested, including wrongful arrests. | Woodridge contends the fee is a lawful government-service cost tied to bail/bond, not a punitive arrest penalty. | Fee interpreted as bail/bond-related; no due-process violation under this construction. |
| Does Markadonatos have standing to challenge the fee? | Plaintiff seeks damages and challenging policy in general; injury is the $30 taken at booking. | Village argues no standing given the asserted injury ties to later events or outcomes. | Court finds standing to challenge the arrest-fee policy under the actual practice as charged at booking. |
| Is it permissible to use constitutional avoidance to save a repealed local ordinance? | Avoidance should not be used to validate past unconstitutional conduct. | Avoidance can save legislation by narrowly interpreting the ordinance to avoid constitutional issues. | Court adopts constitutional avoidance to construe the ordinance narrowly, but acknowledges repeal moots injunctive relief. |
| Should the Illinois Supreme Court be certified to interpret the local ordinance? | Certification could clarify state-law meaning of the ordinance. | Certification is unwarranted; local-ordinance interpretation should come from state courts if necessary. | Certification declined; not appropriate under standards and mootness due to repeal. |
| Does the actual policy of charging arrestees $30 without hearings constitute due process violation as applied? | Policy is arbitrary and deprives property without due process. | Policy provides a service related to bail and is supported by case law on government costs. | Under interpretation limiting to bail/bond, policy does not violate due process as applied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (bail-bond costs as administrative costs, not fines)
- Payton v. County of Carroll, 473 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2007) (bail-system costs and due-process considerations)
- Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (costs for government services need not match exact costs)
- Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (procedural due-process standing and hearing necessity)
- Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (procedural due-process damages nominal relief even without merits)
- Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (probable cause and lawful arrests)
- Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (48-hour rule before magistrate review in custodial arrests)
- Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014) (forfeiture and present-deprivation context in criminal matters)