Jerry Jones v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 811 F.3d 1030

Background

Jerry Jones worked for Bob Evans beginning in 2009 and, with his wife Sharron Shores, filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy shortly thereafter.
The trustee moved to deny confirmation because Shores had not listed a workers' compensation claim; the couple amended schedules and the bankruptcy court confirmed their plan in January 2010 with an order requiring reporting of any "lawsuits" received or receivable during the plan term.
Jones quit Bob Evans in May 2012, filed an EEOC charge six months later, received a right-to-sue letter, and sued Bob Evans in state court in 2013 for race discrimination but did not report the lawsuit or amend his bankruptcy schedules while the Chapter 13 plan remained in effect.
The bankruptcy court discharged the Chapter 13 estate in July 2014; Bob Evans moved for summary judgment in the discrimination suit, arguing Jones was judicially estopped for failing to disclose the claim; the district court granted summary judgment for Bob Evans.
After discharge Jones reopened the bankruptcy, amended schedules to disclose the discrimination claims, and moved the district court to vacate or amend its judgment; the district court denied relief, finding Jones’s late disclosure did not avoid judicial estoppel.
Jones appealed; the Eighth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed, applying the three New Hampshire factors to find judicial estoppel appropriate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jones is judicially estopped from pursuing discrimination claims not disclosed in bankruptcy	Jones argued nondisclosure was inadvertent and he cured it by reopening and amending schedules	Bob Evans argued nondisclosure was intentional and bankruptcy discharge accepted that position, so estoppel bars the suit	Affirmed: judicial estoppel applies; nondisclosure was inconsistent, accepted by bankruptcy court, and could unfairly advantage Jones
Whether confirmed plan’s reporting requirement encompassed postpetition lawsuits	Jones contended duty applied only to recoverable proceeds (disposable income) not to mere claims	Bob Evans argued the confirmation order required reporting of "lawsuits," so claims had to be reported regardless of eventual proceeds	Held: order required reporting of lawsuits; failure to report was a representation that claims did not exist
Whether reopening and amending schedules cures prior nondisclosure for estoppel purposes	Jones claimed late amendment shows inadvertence and cures estoppel	Bob Evans argued reopening after discharge cannot undo prior judicial acceptance and prejudice	Held: late amendment did not prevent application of judicial estoppel; reopening insufficient to cure the earlier misleading position
Whether intent to mislead is required for judicial estoppel in this context	Jones claimed lack of intent; nondisclosure was a mistake	Bob Evans pointed to prior notice (trustee’s earlier motion re: workers' comp) and receipt of right-to-sue as motive to conceal	Held: intent inferred—debtor knew of claims and had motive; nondisclosure deemed intentional for estoppel purposes

Key Cases Cited

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (sets three-factor judicial estoppel framework)
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2006) (judicial estoppel applied where debtor failed to disclose postpetition claim)
E.E.O.C. v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012) (Chapter 13 nondisclosure of discrimination claim supports estoppel)
United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review for motions to amend judgment)
Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (abuse-of-discretion standard for estoppel application)
Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010) (nondisclosure may establish intent to mislead even without different bankruptcy outcome)
In re Waldron, 536 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (trustee could recover settlement proceeds if claims disclosed)
In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999) (defining inadvertence and motive in nondisclosure contexts)