Jeroski v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission
697 F.3d 651
7th Cir.2012Background
- USA Cleaning, a sole proprietorship with fewer than 10 employees, sought EAJA fees after the Mine Safety and Health Administration ordered 24 hours of safety training for janitors at Essroc Cement's plant and issued a withdrawal order.
- USA Cleaning incurred $22,000 in legal fees to challenge the withdrawal order through a contest before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, which vacated the order and dismissed the contest without prejudice.
- The MSHA denied EAJA fees; the Review Commission, as the respondent, upheld that denial and the Secretary of Labor was properly a party, but the Commission itself was not the proper respondent for this review.
- The court discusses Buckhannon and the interpretation of “prevailing party” under EAJA, noting the divergence among circuits on whether a voluntary dismissal or vacatur constitutes prevailing party status.
- The majority aligns with Buckhannon’s framework that a party must obtain relief to be a prevailing party, and thus determines USA Cleaning did not become prevailing party since no enforceable relief was obtained.
- The court ultimately denies USA Cleaning’s petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether USA Cleaning is a prevailing party under EAJA | USA Cleaning seeks prevailing party status due to relief on its challenge to the order. | No prevailing party since the agency action was not resolved in its favor | Not a prevailing party |
| Whether the Secretary of Labor or the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission is the proper respondent | Secretary is proper and the Commission merely upheld the agency’s denial. | The Review Commission is the respondent; the Secretary is proper but the Commission is the entity challenged. | Review Commission is dismissed; Secretary proper respondent |
| Whether Essroc’s net worth or third-party funding affects EAJA eligibility | Eligibility should not hinge on Essroc’s wealth; the small business should recover fees. | Net worth and third-party funding could bar recovery. | Independent ground; not decisive to the outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (Supreme Court, 2001) (defines 'prevailing party' as one obtaining enforceable relief; disfavors fee-shifting for dismissals without prejudice)
- Green Aviation Management Co. v. FAA, 676 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (prevailing party interpretation under EAJA among circuits)
- Turner v. National Transportation Safety Board, 608 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (precedent on 'prevailing party' in EAJA context)
- Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 675 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2012) (fee-shifting considerations including the effect of insurance funding on costs)
- Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 876 (Supreme Court, 1989) (fee-shifting principles underlying access to courts)