Jerome Williams v. United States, 985 F.3d 813

In 1998 Williams was sentenced for bank robbery and illegal firearm possession and received an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on three prior felonies: Kentucky first-degree robbery, Georgia armed robbery, and a federal kidnapping conviction.
At sentencing neither party objected to the ACCA enhancement and the sentencing court did not state which ACCA clause (elements, enumerated, or residual) it relied on to classify the kidnapping as a "violent felony."
After Johnson v. United States and Welch made the ACCA residual clause unconstitutional and retroactive, Williams filed a §2255 "Johnson" motion arguing the sentencing court more likely than not relied solely on the residual clause to enhance his sentence.
The district court denied relief, finding the record silent and the legal landscape in 1998 equivocal as to whether the elements clause could have applied (Salemi and related authority made the question ambiguous).
The Eleventh Circuit applied de novo review to the legal-landscape question and affirmed: Williams failed to prove, by a preponderance, that only the now-invalid residual clause produced the enhancement.
A dissent argued the pre-1998 Eleventh Circuit precedent (Boone, Lewis) and the categorical approach made it more likely the court relied only on the residual clause and would have reversed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Williams)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether Williams proved the sentencing court relied solely on the ACCA residual clause to classify his federal kidnapping as a "violent felony"	Pre-1998 case law made the elements clause unlikely to apply to federal kidnapping (Boone, Lewis); contemporaneous authority more often relied on the residual clause, so residual clause likely produced enhancement	The legal landscape in 1998 was ambiguous; binding and persuasive precedents (e.g., Salemi and other circuit authorities) made the elements clause at least as likely a basis; Williams bears the burden to show residual clause alone and record is silent	Affirmed: Williams did not meet his burden; it is not more likely than not the sentencing court relied only on the residual clause
Standard of review for assessing the "legal landscape" historical question	De novo review is appropriate because the question here is primarily legal (what was the controlling law in 1998)	Same	The court applied de novo review to this mixed question and analyzed precedents from 1998 accordingly

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (SCOTUS: ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (SCOTUS: Johnson error is retroactive on collateral review)
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) (movant must show residual clause "more likely than not" produced enhancement)
United States v. Pickett, 916 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2019) (ambiguous precedent defeats a Johnson claim absent clear proof the residual clause alone was used)
United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1994) (held federal kidnapping qualifies as violent under an identically worded Sentencing Guideline elements clause)
United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussion that federal kidnapping may be accomplished by inveiglement and need not include a physical-force element)
United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussed elements of federal kidnapping in a case involving force but treated statutory elements without a force requirement)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (Supreme Court: categorical approach for determining whether prior offenses qualify under ACCA elements clause)
United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415 (11th Cir. 1994) (Eleventh Circuit applying Taylor’s categorical approach to sentencing analyses)