Jerome Lydale Anderson v. State
06-15-00112-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 22, 2015Background
- Police executed a search warrant at Jerome Anderson’s residence (Sept. 23, 2011) after a confidential informant reported seeing him with cocaine and marijuana; drugs were recovered.
- Anderson was arrested, read Miranda/Art. 38.22 warnings, and gave a recorded custodial interview in which he admitted possession of the cocaine.
- Two-and-a-half years later defense counsel moved (3 days before trial) for a continuance to secure a purportedly "key" witness, former officer Brody West, alleging the State failed to disclose his address and that West was under federal investigation. The trial court denied the continuance.
- Anderson was convicted and sentenced to 15 years; he later moved for new trial alleging newly discovered evidence and re-urging the continuance claim. No new evidence about West was presented at the motion for new trial.
- On appeal the State argues: (1) the custodial interview was properly admitted because Anderson knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived rights; (2) the continuance was properly denied for lack of compliance with Art. 29.06 and lack of diligence; (3) no Brady violation occurred (and any complaint was not preserved).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of custodial interview / waiver of Miranda and Art. 38.22 rights | Anderson contends no explicit or implied waiver of Miranda/Art. 38.22 §3 was shown, so statements should be excluded | State contends warnings were given, Anderson understood them, did not request counsel or stop the interview, and conduct implied a voluntary waiver; trial court reviewed exhibits and found waiver | Trial court’s admission of the recorded statement upheld: totality of circumstances supports voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver; no reversible error noted |
| Denial of continuance for want of witness (Brody West) | Defense argued State failed to provide West’s address and other discovery, and West’s testimony or impeachment was critical—thus continuance required | State argued motion failed Article 29.06 requirements, defense lacked due diligence (subpoenas issued days before trial), and West was not on State’s witness list nor intended to be called | Denial upheld: motion for continuance inadequate under Art. 29.06; defense did not show required diligence or materiality; no abuse of discretion by trial court |
| Brady claim (failure to disclose impeachment/exculpatory info about Brody West) | Anderson alleges the State failed to disclose federal prosecution/investigation of West and relationship to confidential informant, which undermines trial fairness | State: claim not preserved, State disclosed what it knew, federal files are not necessarily within State’s possession/prosecutorial team, evidence (if any) was public and impeachment only, and not material given confession and other evidence | Brady claim rejected: not preserved and, on the record, no suppression shown; any information was impeachment/public and not material to outcome |
| Appropriate remedy for alleged discovery/Brady error | Defense sought relief including continuance and later pressed for relief on appeal | State argues remedy should not be entry of acquittal; proper remedy for Brady is reversal and remand for new trial if materiality shown | Court (State brief) opposes acquittal; holds that reversal/remand (if any) is proper remedy, but here no reversible error shown so affirm conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (recognizing Miranda warnings and waiver analysis)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (waiver may be inferred from suspect’s actions and statements)
- Hernandez v. State, 387 S.W.3d 881 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) (totality-of-circumstances waiver review; deference on historical facts)
- Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (burden to prove Miranda/Art. 38.22 waiver by preponderance)
- Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (Brady framework: nondisclosure, favorability, materiality)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality standard; collective evaluation of undisclosed evidence)
- Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (Brady/constitutional disclosure duties)
- Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002) (continuance and discovery context; accessible impeachment evidence)
- Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2015) (application of Berghuis/Joseph waiver principles)