828 F.3d 658
8th Cir.2016Background
- On May 11, 2007 Armando Calix was shot and killed; investigators linked Toriano Dorman and Jerome Davis to the scene via eyewitness identification, phone records, and witness Gentle’s statements.
- Police arrested Davis a week later on an unrelated assault; homicide detective Sgt. Karakostas read Miranda warnings and interviewed Davis in a recorded room.
- During the interview Davis initially waived Miranda, made statements inconsistent with other evidence, then said “I don’t want to talk” and requested an attorney; Karakostas suspended questioning, later reread Miranda, and continued the interview after Davis said he understood and wanted to talk.
- The videotaped interview (several hours) included a portion after Davis’s initial invocation that placed him inside the apartment at the time of the shooting; the trial court denied suppression and played the recordings at trial.
- A jury convicted Davis of first-degree felony murder; Minnesota Supreme Court assumed a Miranda violation but held any error in admitting the later portion of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Davis sought federal habeas relief under AEDPA claiming the state court unreasonably applied federal harmless-error precedent; the federal district court denied relief and this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission of statements after Davis invoked his right to silence violated Miranda and, if so, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Davis: post-invocation portion was inadmissible and not harmless because it uniquely placed him in the apartment and undermined his credibility | State: Minnesota Sup. Ct. reasonably found the contested portion cumulative/exculpatory, credibility damage occurred earlier, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Assumed Miranda violation for purposes of review but held state court’s harmless-error ruling was not an unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law under AEDPA; habeas denied |
| Whether the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) | Davis: state court’s harmlessness finding conflicted with Supreme Court harmless-error standards (Sullivan/Fry/Brecht) and was objectively unreasonable | State: AEDPA requires deference; state court’s analysis was plausible and not beyond fair-minded disagreement | Court: No "contrary to" holding; no objectively unreasonable application of federal law; AEDPA precludes relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police must honor suspect’s invocation of right to remain silent and right to counsel)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (voluntariness and due-process limits on confession admissibility)
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (standard for reversal where jury instruction error is not harmless: whether verdict is "surely unattributable" to error)
- Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (habeas relief requires showing the trial error had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the verdict under Brecht)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (standard for prejudice on habeas review: substantial and injurious effect)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" standards)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) ("objectively unreasonable" standard under AEDPA)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (deference owed to state-court adjudications under AEDPA)
- Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (state court need not cite Supreme Court cases to avoid being "contrary to" clearly established federal law)