Jermaine McKinley v. State of Indiana
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 667
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- On May 21, 2014 Indianapolis officers arrested Jermaine McKinley and, incident to arrest, found five small baggies later confirmed as 5.233 grams of cocaine and $720 on his person. McKinley admitted the baggies contained cocaine and made statements suggesting concern about the drugs being "all bagged up."
- The State charged McKinley with Count I: dealing in cocaine (possession with intent to deliver; Class A felony because amount >3 g) and Count II: possession of cocaine (Class C felony). The jury convicted on both counts; Count II merged into Count I at sentencing.
- Preliminary and final jury instructions described the elements of dealing in cocaine as including that the defendant "knowingly possessed with intent to deliver" cocaine. The court defined "knowingly" in a separate instruction but did not define "intent to deliver."
- Defense made no contemporaneous objection to the instruction that included the term "knowingly" as an element; defense argument at trial focused on whether McKinley had intent to deliver versus personal use.
- On appeal McKinley argued the instructions misstated the mens rea by treating the statute as requiring only "knowing" conduct rather than the specific intent to deliver; he urged fundamental error review because he did not object at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether inclusion of the word "knowingly" in the elements for possession with intent to deliver misstated the required mens rea and amounted to fundamental error | State: the statute language "knowingly or intentionally" in § 35-48-4-1(a)(1) should be read to cover subsection (a)(2) too; instructions track statutory language and charging info | McKinley: the crime requires a specific intent to deliver; using only "knowingly" allowed conviction without finding specific intent as to delivery or other material elements | Court: rejected both readings of the statute, found no fundamental error because (1) statutory structure does not import (a)(1) language into (a)(2); (2) specific intent to deliver was adequately conveyed by charging info, preliminary and final instructions, and closing arguments; intent to deliver was central at trial so jury was not misled |
Key Cases Cited
- Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469 (Ind. 2015) (fundamental error standard for jury instructions)
- Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. 2002) (erroneous instruction evaluated in context of all jury information)
- Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 2002) (mental culpability requirement applied to offense elements as written; "knowingly" instruction sufficient where statute required knowing conduct)
- Bookwalter v. State, 22 N.E.3d 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (no requirement to prove intent to deliver a specific weight to enhance to Class A)
- Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. 2000) (Spradlin error principles: inclusion of lesser mens rea can be harmless where intent element elsewhere clearly presented)
- Metcalfe v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1999) (any instruction suggesting a lesser mens rea is inadequate)
- Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8 (Ind. 2015) (framework for assessing Spradlin instruction errors)
- White v. State, 846 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (contemporaneous objection rule for jury-instruction claims)
- Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 1991) (instructions must include specific intent when statute requires it)