Jeremy Snider v. United States
908 F.3d 183
6th Cir.2018Background
- Jeremy Snider was convicted in 2007 of federal drug- and firearm-related offenses and sentenced in 2008 to a total of 300 months (300 months on Counts 1–5; 60 months consecutive on Count 6). At sentencing the PSR classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on prior Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions, yielding an advisory guidelines range that supported a higher exposure.
- Snider did not object at sentencing to treating his Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as crimes of violence; on direct appeal one count was reversed and dismissed, leaving the 300-month sentence intact.
- Snider filed a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition asserting (among other things) ineffective assistance at sentencing for failure to object to career-offender treatment and later supplemented his motion relying on post-sentencing Supreme Court and circuit decisions (Mathis, Descamps, Alleyne, and ultimately Stitt).
- The district court denied § 2255 relief, concluding Snider still qualified as a career offender based on another listed Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction, and relied on pre-Stitt Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance/Priddy) that Tennessee aggravated burglary equated to generic burglary for guideline/ACCA purposes.
- The Sixth Circuit majority affirmed: it held that (1) Snider’s challenge to an advisory-guidelines career-offender calculation is not cognizable on § 2255 collateral review absent the narrow, exceptional circumstances required by Davis/Addonizio, and (2) counsel was not ineffective for failing to predict later changes in circuit law (Stitt/Mathis).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stitt (en banc) requires vacatur of Snider’s career-offender designation under the Guidelines because Tennessee aggravated burglary is not a crime of violence | Snider: Stitt overruled Nance and shows Tennessee aggravated burglary is broader/indivisible and thus not a crime of violence for § 4B1.1 purposes | Govt: Stitt addresses ACCA and not advisory Guidelines; Snider forfeited a sentencing objection and cannot collaterally relitigate an advisory-Guidelines calculation | Court: Declined to dismiss on that ground but reached merits differently — treated Stitt/Mathis as relevant but found other reasons to deny relief (see cognizability and ineffective-assistance holdings) |
| Whether a non-constitutional challenge to an advisory-guidelines career-offender calculation is cognizable on § 2255 collateral review | Snider: Intervening authoritative change in law (Stitt/Mathis) renders career-offender designation invalid, so § 2255 relief is proper | Govt: § 2255 cognizability is limited; advisory-guidelines miscalculations do not generally qualify for collateral relief; Snider’s sentence was lawful and within statutory maximum | Court: Denied relief — non-constitutional advisory-guidelines miscalculation does not meet the exceptionally narrow § 2255 standard (Davis/Addonizio/Foote); Snider’s sentence remained within an applicable advisory range even without career-offender treatment, so no miscarriage of justice shown |
| Whether Snider received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing by not objecting to career-offender designation | Snider: Counsel should have objected under the (later) view that Tennessee aggravated burglary is not a qualifying crime of violence | Govt: Counsel’s performance was reasonable based on contemporaneous Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance/Arnold/Priddy); no prejudice shown | Court: Denied — counsel’s failure to anticipate later adverse precedent was not objectively unreasonable; given prevailing law at the time an objection would likely fail; prejudice not established |
| Whether procedural-default or other procedural defenses bar Snider’s claims | Snider: (implicitly) claims preserved sufficiently or excused by changed law/ineffectiveness | Govt: Claims were forfeited by not objecting at sentencing and/or procedurally defaulted | Court: Did not decide procedural-default defense because claims fail on merits and cognizability grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Tennessee aggravated burglary is broader and indivisible; not a violent felony under ACCA)
- United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2007) (prior Sixth Circuit holding that Tennessee aggravated burglary matched generic burglary)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (statutory elements/divisibility analysis for categorical approach)
- United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir. 2015) (post-sentencing change in law re: advisory career-offender designation not cognizable under § 2255)
- Addonizio v. United States, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) (post-sentencing expectations or subjective judge assumptions do not warrant § 2255 relief absent fundamental error)
- Davis v. United States, 417 F.3d 333 (Note: Davis is 1974 U.S. Supreme Court decision cited in opinion) (1974) (§ 2255 relief available where conduct later determined not criminal; establishes ‘miscarriage of justice’ standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (ineffective-assistance claims are cognizable on collateral review)
(Note: The opinion also discusses other Supreme Court precedents and guideline cases—e.g., Peugh, Molina-Martinez, Johnson—that frame the § 2255 and sentencing-guidelines analysis.)