Jeremy Moseley v. Tiffiny Moseley Smith
180 So. 3d 667
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Moseley and Smith divorced in 2000; the chancery-court divorce judgment incorporated a property-settlement agreement awarding Moseley the 1998 Camaro and requiring him to be solely responsible for its debt and to "hold [Smith] harmless" for any debt associated with the vehicle.
- Moseley filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Arizona in 2001, listing Trustmark Bank as a secured creditor for the Camaro loan but neither listing Smith as a creditor/co-debtor nor notifying her of the bankruptcy; Moseley received a discharge in July 2001.
- Trustmark later sued Smith; she was finally served in September 2006 and a 2007 judgment required her to pay the remaining Camaro debt plus interest; her wages were garnished to satisfy that judgment.
- Smith filed a contempt action in February 2011 seeking reimbursement from Moseley under the hold-harmless provision; the chancery court denied Moseley’s dismissal motions and awarded Smith $36,036.18 (reimbursement, attorney’s fees, travel).
- Moseley appealed, arguing (1) his bankruptcy discharged the obligation and (2) the claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations; he also argued the damages award lacked record support.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Moseley’s 2001 bankruptcy discharged his obligation to hold Smith harmless | Smith: obligation arose from the divorce judgment and was not discharged because she was not listed or notified in bankruptcy | Moseley: bankruptcy discharged all Camaro-related obligations, including any obligation to Smith | Held: Not discharged — Moseley did not schedule Smith or give notice, and the hold-harmless debt is a separate obligation not discharged absent timely creditor action |
| Whether Smith’s contempt action was barred by the statute of limitations | Smith: action enforces a court judgment; seven-year limitations applies and was triggered when she was first harmed (served in Sept 2006) | Moseley: claim is a contract claim (3-year) or, if 7-year, it began at divorce in 2000 so suit filed in 2011 is untimely | Held: Seven-year limitations for actions founded on judgments applies to property-settlement provisions incorporated into divorce decrees; limitations began when Smith was first harmed (Sept 2006), so her 2011 filing was timely |
| Whether the chancellor erred in awarding the monetary amount for contempt | Smith: requested reimbursement of amounts paid to Trustmark (including interest), attorney’s fees, and travel to make her whole | Moseley: record does not support the damages award | Held: Award affirmed — reimbursement amount based on Trustmark judgment and affidavit; attorney’s fees and travel reasonable and supported by court’s discretion and prior agreed order |
| Standard for treating property-settlement provisions (contract v. court order) | Smith: property-settlement agreement, once approved and incorporated, is a court judgment enforceable under the 7-year statute | Moseley: property-settlement provisions should be enforced like ordinary contracts (3-year limitations) | Held: Property-settlement agreements approved and incorporated into divorce decrees are court orders enforceable as judgments; the seven-year statute applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Varner v. Varner, 666 So.2d 493 (Miss. 1995) (property-settlement agreements become court orders when approved and incorporated into divorce decrees)
- Grier v. Grier, 616 So.2d 337 (Miss. 1993) (court approval injects the court into the property-settlement process)
- Carite v. Carite, 841 So.2d 1148 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (seven-year limitations applied to actions enforcing domestic judgments related to property awards)
- West v. West, 891 So.2d 203 (Miss. 2004) (property-settlement provisions are interpreted like contracts)
- Bounds v. Bounds, 935 So.2d 407 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (attorney’s fees in contempt awarded to make the plaintiff whole)