174 So. 3d 331
Miss. Ct. App.2015Background
- On Oct. 6, 2012, Jeremy Snyder was stopped for speeding; officers detected alcohol (and an odor of marijuana in the truck), observed slurred speech and unsteadiness, and arrested him after he refused field sobriety and Intoxilyzer tests.
- Snyder admitted prior DUI convictions and refused chemical testing, claiming counsel advised refusal; because he had two prior DUIs within five years, he was charged with felony (third-offense) DUI under Mississippi law.
- Before trial Snyder sought to exclude references to his prior DUIs and the marijuana odor; the court denied the motions but accepted Snyder’s stipulation to the two prior convictions and gave a limiting instruction that priors could only be used to prove the two-prior element.
- During trial the State elicited testimony referencing Snyder’s prior experiences with sobriety and breath tests (to show knowledge/intent for refusing tests) and argued in closing this was “not his first rodeo.” An officer testified to smelling marijuana in the truck.
- Officer Gordon’s dash-cam recorded the stop but the memory card was later recorded over; Snyder requested a spoliation instruction and argued a due-process violation; the trial judge refused both and the jury convicted Snyder of felony DUI.
- On appeal Snyder argued (1) prior-DUI references violated Rigby and Rule 404(b), (2) prosecutorial misconduct in closing, (3) marijuana-smell evidence was irrelevant/prejudicial, and (4) erased dash-cam required a spoliation instruction or due-process remedy. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Snyder's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether references to Snyder’s two prior DUI convictions during testimony violated Rigby/Rule 404(b) and required exclusion | Any reference to priors (beyond the stipulation) was improper and likely to show propensity; Rigby limits mention of priors to proving the two-prior element | Priors are elements of felony DUI; references here were admissible to show knowledge/intent for refusing tests and were permitted under Rule 404(b) and § 63-11-41 | Admissible. Court followed Rigby (stipulation + limiting instruction) and found testimony about prior test experience was admissible to show knowledge/intent; no reversible error |
| Whether prosecutor’s “not his first rodeo” closing constituted misconduct | Comment improperly invited the jury to convict based on past DUIs and was inflammatory; judge should have sua sponte intervened | Closing argument fell within wide latitude; remark related to elements and evidence (priors, refusal), not unduly prejudicial | Not misconduct. Phrase not so inflammatory to require sua sponte objection; even if reviewed, remark was proper given evidence and context |
| Admissibility of testimony that truck smelled of marijuana | Smell was irrelevant to DUI and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403; should have been excluded | Officer observations are admissible; State may present the complete story and such sensory observations are probative | Admissible. Trial judge did not abuse discretion; testimony was relevant and probative and not unduly prejudicial |
| Whether erased dash-cam required a spoliation instruction or violated due process | Erasure deprived Snyder of potentially exculpatory evidence; jury should be instructed to presume video favorable or conviction reversed | Memory card was routinely recorded over, officer acted in good faith and was unaware the stop would be a felony; no bad faith or court order to preserve; exculpatory value not shown | No relief. Spoliation instruction requires evidence of intentional/bad-faith destruction; Trombetta/Youngblood (and state precedent) require bad faith for due-process relief and Snyder failed to prove it or that the video was evidently exculpatory |
Key Cases Cited
- Rigby v. State, 826 So. 2d 694 (Miss. 2002) (two prior DUIs are elements of felony DUI; stipulations and limiting instructions required)
- Knight v. State, 14 So. 3d 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (refusal-to-blow evidence admissible; defendant’s stated reason bears on intent)
- Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659 (Miss. 2000) (limits on inflammatory prosecutorial argument)
- Spicer v. State, 921 So. 2d 292 (Miss. 2006) (two-step test for evaluating prosecutorial remarks)
- Long v. State, 52 So. 3d 1188 (Miss. 2011) (circumstances where no procedural bar to review of inflammatory argument)
- Freeman v. State, 121 So. 3d 888 (Miss. 2013) (court-ordered preservation of video and consequences for failure to preserve)
- Hardy v. State, 137 So. 3d 289 (Miss. 2014) (spoliation instruction requires intentional destruction)
- Johnston v. State, 618 So. 2d 90 (Miss. 1993) (no presumption of favorable evidence absent intentional destruction)
- Ellis v. State, 77 So. 3d 1119 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (no due-process violation where memory card routinely overwritten and no bad faith)
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (U.S. 1984) (test for destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1988) (bad-faith requirement for due-process claim when evidence destroyed)