Jereme Lee Wall v. Alfred H. Plummer, III
13 N.E.3d 420
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In 1992 Jereme Lee Wall was convicted of class C felony criminal mischief and sentenced to three years with all but 120 days suspended to probation.
- In February 1993 Wall admitted violating probation (failing to update his address) and the court revoked the suspended portion of his sentence.
- In September 2013 Wall petitioned under Indiana Code § 35-38-9-4 (as then written) to expunge his felony conviction records, asserting he met statutory requirements.
- The statute permitted a felony-convicted person to petition for expungement not earlier than eight years after completion of sentence, provided by clear and convincing evidence the person had completed the sentence (including supervised release), had no pending charges or license suspension, and had no convictions in the prior eight years.
- The trial court denied the petition, finding Wall had not successfully completed his sentence because of his probation violation; Wall appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wall "successfully completed his sentence" under § 35-38-9-4 despite a probation violation | Wall: He completed his sentence and supervised release and thus meets statutory requirements for expungement | State: Wall admitted to and had sentence revoked for a probation violation, so he did not successfully complete his sentence | Affirmed: Probation violation means Wall did not successfully complete his sentence, so expungement properly denied |
| Whether statute distinguishes "technical" vs. "major" probation violations for expungement eligibility | Wall: His violation was merely "technical," should not bar expungement | State: Statute contains no distinction; any violation precludes "successful completion" | Court: Statute makes no such distinction; all violations defeat eligibility |
| Whether court must construe expungement statute in light of reformation (Ind. Const. art. I, § 18) | Wall: Denying expungement here violates the constitutional principle favoring reformation over vindictiveness | State: Statute's plain language governs eligibility; constitutional provision does not alter text | Court: Interpretation consistent with statutory text; constitutional argument unpersuasive |
| Standard of statutory interpretation applicable on appeal | Wall: N/A (contested result) | State: N/A | Court: Review de novo; give words plain and ordinary meaning and harmonize statute parts |
Key Cases Cited
- Dykstra v. City of Hammond, 985 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- City of Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. 2007) (statutory provisions read together to avoid rendering any part meaningless)
- Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2007) (legislative intent best shown by statutory language)