Jensen v. Beirne
241 Ariz. 225
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Beirne and Jensen's 2005 divorce decree allocated two real properties to Beirne (Unit 1103 in Scottsdale and the Hadley Highstone property in England) and required Beirne to refinance the mortgages in his name within 90 days; he did not.
- Court ordered in Dec 2005 that Jensen may place both properties for sale and have a right of first refusal; proceeds to go to Beirne with reimbursement to Jensen for payments.
- Multiple subsequent court orders (2006–2008) directed sale of Unit 1103, appointed a special real estate commissioner, and ultimately ordered sale to Jensen and clerk authority to sign if Beirne did not cooperate; little enforcement occurred afterward.
- Beirne filed a petition in July 2015 seeking enforcement: (a) require Jensen to pay him current equity for the Hadley property so he would deed his interest, and (b) require Jensen to quitclaim Unit 1103 so he could refinance.
- The family court initially ordered relief but then vacated it and dismissed Beirne’s petition with prejudice on grounds the orders were time‑barred under A.R.S. § 12‑1551; Beirne appealed.
- The appellate court reversed, holding § 12‑1551 (a five‑year renewal rule for money judgments and liens) does not apply to equitable property distributions in divorce decrees and, even if it did, the limitations period had not begun to run because triggering events (sale or an expressed refusal to sell) had not occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.R.S. § 12‑1551 bars enforcement of the dissolution decree/orders | § 12‑1551 does not apply because the decree is equitable property distribution, not a money judgment or lien | § 12‑1551 applies and the five‑year renewal period expired, so the court lacks power to enforce | Court held § 12‑1551 is inapplicable to these dissolution decree property directives and reversed dismissal |
| If § 12‑1551 applied, whether the limitations period had been triggered | Limitations did not start because decree required sale only upon future events (sale or refusal); no right to sue until event occurs | Limitations started from entry of decree/orders and therefore expired | Court held even if § 12‑1551 applied, the period had not begun because the sale or refusal condition had not occurred |
| Whether family court retained equitable authority to enforce or modify decree | Family court retains equitable power to enforce decree or fashion new relief to achieve full and complete justice | Court below treated § 12‑1551 as stripping power to enforce | Court reaffirmed family court’s ongoing equitable enforcement power over dissolution decrees (subject to statutory limits) |
| Whether Beirne is entitled to appellate attorney fees | Beirne sought fees under A.R.S. § 25‑324 due to disparity in resources | Jensen did not file an answering brief; no opposing fee argument presented | Court awarded fees; amount to be determined after proper application per appellate rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Johnson, 195 Ariz. 389, 988 P.2d 621 (discussing application of § 12‑1551 to money judgments)
- Groves v. Sorce, 161 Ariz. 619, 780 P.2d 452 (limitations do not run on a judgment that is not suable until a triggering event occurs)
- Genda v. Superior Court (Pima Cty.), 103 Ariz. 240, 439 P.2d 811 (family court’s equitable power to enforce divorce decrees to achieve full and complete justice)
- City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 181 P.3d 219 (de novo review of statute‑of‑limitations statutory interpretation)