644 F.3d 934
9th Cir.2011Background
- District adopted Rules 220, 310, and 1010 in 2007 to regulate diesel engines used in agriculture, imposing registration/fee requirements and stationary-engine emissions standards.
- Jensen Family Farms, a California agricultural operator, owns diesel engines used for irrigation and registered some engines in 2008 with the District and paid fees.
- CARB had previously adopted an ATCM for diesel particulate matter, and Rule 1010 is framed as a replacement rule for CARB's ATCM.
- Jensen filed suit in November 2008 alleging federal preemption under the Clean Air Act, California law violations, and due process claims; CARB intervened following the district court’s scheduling order.
- The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants, rejecting Jensen’s preemption and due process theories and diminishing scope of Rule 1010.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held Rules 220 and 310 are not preempted by the CAA, Rule 1010 is not preempted as it applies to stationary engines, and Jensen’s due process and state-law challenges fail.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Rules 220 and 310 preempted by the CAA? | Jensen argues the rules relate to emissions control and thus fall under § 209(e) preemption. | District/ CARB contend registration/fees are not emissions standards and thus not preempted. | Rules 220 and 310 are not preempted. |
| Do Rules 220 and 310 relate to emissions control under § 209(e)? | Rules broadly relate to air pollution control by the District's mission. | Rules impose info/fees, not emissions standards or controls. | Not standards or requirements relating to emission control; not preempted. |
| Is Rule 1010 preempted by the CAA as a nonroad emissions standard? | Rule 1010 sets emissions standards for stationary engines that may regulate nonroad sources. | Rule 1010 applies only to stationary engines and stationary/nonroad definitions are mutually exclusive; not preempted. | Rule 1010 is not preempted; applies to stationary engines and not to nonroad engines. |
| Are Jensen's remaining arguments, including state preemption and due process, meritorious? | Rules preempted by state authority and violate due process; and possibly tax-like regulatory fees. | Preemption lacking; regulations have rational basis and do not impose punitive taxes. | State preemption and due process claims fail; petition denied. |
| Waiver of California constitutional tax argument | Argues Rule 220/310 tax-like charges not approved by electorate. | Argument not raised in complaint; waived. | Waived. |
Key Cases Cited
- General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530 (1990) (partnership of federal and state in air pollution regulation)
- Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describes stationary vs mobile regulation and preemption scope)
- South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (definitive framework for 'standards relating to the control of emissions')
- Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008) (nonroad-related preemption while awaiting EPA authorization)
- Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (limits broad application of 'relating to' preemption)
- Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 627 F.3d 730 (9th Cir. 2010) (implied preemption under § 209(e) when EPA authorization lacking)
- Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (definition and limits of 'relating to' in preemption context)
- Ex parte United States Engineers Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast, 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (statutory construction and preemption of emissions standards)
- California v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) (state action and preemption context)