934 F.3d 910
9th Cir.2019Background
- Flores Agreement (consent decree, 1997) requires detained minors be held in facilities that are "safe and sanitary" and with "special concern for [their] particular vulnerability," and generally favors release to parents or licensed nonsecure facilities.
- Plaintiffs moved to enforce the Agreement in 2016, alleging Border Patrol stations held minors in unsafe/unsanitary conditions (insufficient food/water, lack of hygiene items, sleep deprivation, overcrowding) and detained minors in secure/unlicensed facilities.
- After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found violations of ¶12A (safe and sanitary), ¶14 (release efforts), and ¶19 (placement in licensed facilities) and ordered enforcement; it directed the government to appoint an internal Juvenile Coordinator (¶28A) to report to the court.
- The government appealed, arguing the district court modified the Agreement by (1) imposing specific hygiene/sleep/food standards beyond the text, (2) requiring consideration of release for minors in expedited removal, and (3) prohibiting detention of minors in secure, unlicensed family detention centers.
- The Ninth Circuit concluded the district court interpreted and enforced the Agreement (did not modify it) and therefore lacked jurisdiction to review the appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court modified the Flores Agreement by enforcing specific hygiene, sleep, and food standards under ¶12A | Flores: conditions (food, water, bedding, soap, toothbrushes, sleep) fall within ¶12A’s "safe and sanitary" and vulnerability protections | Barr: those specifics are not in the text; imposing them modifies the Agreement and is beyond enforcement | Court: Enforcement was interpretation of ¶12A; those basic necessities are within the Agreement and do not modify it; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether ¶12A is too vague to enforce or leaves compliance specifics to government | Flores: ordinary meaning supplies workable, enforceable standards protecting minors' safety and health | Barr: phrase is vague and nonjusticiable or delegates specifics to the government | Court: ¶12A is sufficiently definite; district court’s factual findings applied commonsense standards and did not impermissibly delegate |
| Whether Agreement requires considering release for minors in expedited removal proceedings | Flores: Agreement’s presumption favoring release is consistent with INA and regulations allowing parole for juveniles | Barr: Expedited removal requires detention; interpreting Agreement to require consideration of release conflicts with INA | Court: Government regulations and discretion (including parole provisions) permit consideration of release; district court’s interpretation consistent with law; not a modification |
| Whether Agreement prohibits detaining minors in secure, unlicensed family detention centers | Flores: Agreement presumes placement in licensed, non-secure facilities; district court previously held detention in secure/unlicensed centers violates Agreement | Barr: contest raised on appeal | Court: Issue already addressed in earlier proceedings and not properly re-raised on appeal; not before this panel |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. 1.377 Acres of Land, 352 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2003) (contract interpretation should give effect to every provision)
- Thompson v. Enomoto, 815 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1987) (appealability of orders appointing special masters depends on whether consent decree was modified)
- Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where order enforced but did not modify consent decree)
- Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016) (Flores Agreement creates presumption in favor of releasing minors)
- Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (Agreement obligations apply to DHS/HHS and limits on secure detention)
- Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC, 862 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpretive canon: the specific governs the general)
- Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 74 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1996) (parties may not advance new legal theories on successive appeals)