Jennifer Weinstein v. Jeanmarie Leonard and Carol Sayour v. Lloyd J. Weinstein and The Weinstein Group, P.C.
134 A.3d 547
| Vt. | 2015Background
- Neighbors in Rocking Stone Farm subdivision disputed defendants’ (Leonard and Sayour) permit to build a barn on Lot #10; plaintiff Jennifer Weinstein owned adjacent Lot #9. Defendants obtained local zoning approval and an HOA waiver; Weinstein appealed through the DRB, Environmental Division, and this Court.
- The Declaration for the subdivision contains Section 14.2 (titled Acknowledgments) which provides that each owner will not "contest or interfere with any development of the Community so long as such development is consistent with the Land Use Approvals."
- Defendants sued Weinstein (and counterclaimed against her) alleging, among other torts and contract claims, that her appeals and related litigation breached §14.2; they also asserted third-party claims against Weinstein’s husband Lloyd and his firm for facilitating breaches and abuse of process.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Weinstein and to Lloyd Weinstein & The Weinstein Group, P.C., dismissing defendants’ counterclaims except for two claims which defendants later withdrew; defendants appealed.
- On appeal the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed de novo and considered: (1) whether §14.2 validly waived owners’ rights to participate in administrative and judicial land‑use proceedings; (2) abuse of process claims against Weinstein and her counsel; and (3) an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim by Leonard.
Issues
| Issue | Weinstein's Argument | Leonard/Sayour's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability/scope of §14.2 non‑interference clause (breach of contract) | §14.2 does not bar Weinstein from pursuing DRB or court review; any waiver of such rights must be clear and is not present here. | §14.2 bars objections/appeals to developments consistent with Land Use Approvals; Weinstein’s appeals and suit breached the contract. | Court: §14.2 does not unambiguously waive rights to participate in administrative/regulatory proceedings or to seek judicial review; as a contract‑of‑adhesion waiver it fails Colgan standards and is unenforceable for that purpose. Summary judgment for Weinstein affirmed. |
| Third‑party claim that counsel (Lloyd/The Weinstein Group) induced breach | If contract claim fails as to Weinstein, facilitation claim against counsel also fails. | Counsel actively facilitated the alleged breach and should be liable. | Court: Because plaintiff’s contract claim fails, derivative facilitation claim against counsel fails as well. |
| Abuse of process (against Weinstein and counsel) | Weinstein: litigation was a proper use of process to vindicate rights; withdrawal of claims does not make process abusive. Counsel: letters to represented parties were poor judgment but not misuse of court process. | Defendants: suits and procedural tactics were malicious, frivolous, and intended to harass; counsel’s conduct (contacting represented parties, other acts) supports abuse of process. | Court: Dismissed. No improper use of court process shown; motive alone insufficient. Professional misconduct claims against counsel belong in ethical or Rule 11/relief proceedings, not abuse of process. |
| Intrusion upon seclusion / invasion of privacy (Leonard) | Weinstein: isolated hostile encounter and threats/litigation do not constitute substantial, highly offensive intrusion. | Leonard: plaintiff’s yelling/approach with a large dog and repeated legal threats amounted to persistent, highly offensive intrusion. | Court: Dismissed. Single confrontational incident and litigation threats are not the substantial, repeated intrusion required for tort liability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Colgan v. Agway, 553 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1988) (contractual disclaimers of tort liability must be unmistakably clear to be enforced)
- Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1995) (exculpatory clauses scrutinized for fairness and public policy concerns)
- Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542 A.2d 265 (Vt. 1988) (access to courts is an essential constitutional right; tortious‑interference by filing suit is not recognized)
- Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports, 945 A.2d 368 (Vt. 2008) (release language must clearly convey negligent‑liability waiver)
- Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Weible, 92 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 1996) (filing suit, even with malicious motive, is not itself abuse of process)
- Nashef v. AADCO Medical, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 413 (D. Vt. 2013) (abuse‑of‑process requires misuse of court process itself, not merely malicious litigation)