Jennifer M. (Roetcisoender) Whaley v. Jason D. Gray, 33764-2

Parents (Roetcisoender and Gray) had a 2009 parenting plan placing H.G. primarily with Gray and restricting contact with Roetcisoender’s then-boyfriend due to alleged violence.
Over time H.G. lived nearly full-time with Gray; Roetcisoender sought increased visitation in 2013; Gray sought and obtained decreased visitation after H.G. showed extreme distress about visiting mother.
Mental-health providers diagnosed H.G. with PTSD, anxiety, and depression; providers linked H.G.’s symptoms (including skin-picking and panic about visits) to exposure to domestic violence and excessive discipline.
Trial evidence included testimony about Roetcisoender’s past relationships (some allegedly abusive) and a disputed incident in which H.G. was put in a shower with clothes on as punishment.
The trial court found emotional abuse and exposure to domestic violence, awarded Gray sole decision-making, suspended normal visitation, and ordered therapeutic reintegration supervised by a counselor.

Issue	Roetcisoender's Argument	Gray's Argument	Held
Whether the court improperly delegated reunification authority to the counselor	Court impermissibly delegated final discretion to counselor	Counselor only to recommend; court retains final authority	No improper delegation; court retained ultimate control and counselor limited to recommendations
Whether limiting residential time based on emotional abuse was supported	Error: restrictions unjustified; evidence insufficient	Emotional abuse findings supported by mental-health testimony linking symptoms to mother’s home	Affirmed: substantial evidence supports emotional-abuse finding and limit on visitation
Whether finding of exposure to domestic violence relied on impermissible testimony	Much evidence predated 2009 plan and thus was inadmissible for modification	Evidence was either post-plan or unknown to court at plan formation and therefore proper to consider	Affirmed: court permissibly considered unknown pre-plan facts and post-plan incidents to find exposure to domestic violence
Whether modification satisfied best-interest/substantial-change standards	Modification was unwarranted because of stability presumption and disruption	Child’s acute emotional harm justified modification to protect best interests	Affirmed: evidence of H.G.’s distress and danger of harm justified modification under applicable standards

Kirshenbaum v. Kirshenbaum, 84 Wn. App. 798 (1997) (court may delegate limited plan alterations to third parties subject to review)
In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604 (1993) (standard for upholding findings supported by substantial evidence)
In re Marriage of Drlik, 121 Wn. App. 269 (2004) (definition and application of substantial evidence in parenting disputes)
In re Marriage of Zigler, 154 Wn. App. 803 (2010) (unknown facts at time of original plan may justify modification)
In re Marriage of Underwood, 181 Wn. App. 608 (2014) (statutory bases for limiting residential time and application to domestic-violence exposure)
In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632 (2014) (considerations for limiting parenting rights when child’s welfare is endangered)
In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wn.2d 594 (1980) (clarifies unknown facts doctrine in modification context)
In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343 (2001) (reluctance to disturb child placement findings given trial court’s advantage)
In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. 657 (2002) (definition of ‘‘manifest abuse of discretion’’ in custody decisions)