Jennifer L. Frink v. State of Indiana, 52 N.E.3d 842

Background

Jennifer Frink, a former Shelbyville High School secretary, was fired in May 2014 after an 18‑year‑old student alleged a sexual relationship with her.
School principal directed police to issue Frink a written "Criminal Trespass Warning" prohibiting her from entering any School Corporation property; Frink acknowledged the warning.
In November 2014 Frink visited Coulston Elementary to enroll/meet teachers; school staff notified police when they learned of the prior ban.
State charged Frink with Level 6 felony criminal trespass for entering school property after denial of entry.
Frink moved to dismiss under Ind. Code § 35‑34‑1‑4(a)(5) arguing (1) she had a "contractual interest" in school property as a custodial parent and (2) the no‑trespass ban violated her substantive and procedural due process rights.
Trial court denied the motion; interlocutory appeal followed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Frink)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether facts alleged fail to show criminal trespass because Frink had a "contractual interest" in school property	As a custodial parent entitled to her children's public education, Frink claims a contractual interest in school property that the State did not disprove	The trespass statute requires a narrow definition of "contractual interest" (right, title, legal share from a binding agreement); facts show Frink was a former employee specifically denied entry	Court: State alleged sufficient facts to disprove any contractual interest; dismissal denied
Whether the School Corporation's no‑trespass warning violated Frink's substantive due process right to participate in her children's education	School ban infringes a liberty interest in meaningful participation in her children's public education	The claimed liberty interest is not a recognized fundamental right to unfettered physical access to school property; constitutionality of the School's action is not an element of criminal trespass	Court: Due process claims are not proper defenses in a motion to dismiss criminal trespass; must be litigated civilly against the School
Whether procedural due process (indefinite ban without hearing) defeats trespass charge	The School banned Frink indefinitely without hearing; prosecution should be barred or charge dismissed	Procedural safeguards for administrative bans are separate civil matters and lawfulness of the denial is not an element of the trespass offense	Court: Procedural‑due‑process objections are improper on motion to dismiss the criminal information
Appropriate remedy at motion‑to‑dismiss stage	Dismiss information because facts do not constitute an offense or constitutional defects	State: charging information adequately alleges elements of criminal trespass; factual disputes and constitutional claims are for later proceedings or separate civil suit	Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying dismissal; appeal affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2012) (defines "contractual interest in the property" narrowly as rights arising from a binding agreement)
Delagrange v. State, 951 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (standard for appellate review of denial of motion to dismiss)
Lebo v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (facts alleged in information are generally taken as true on motion to dismiss)
State v. Fettig, 884 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (trial court may consider evidence when deciding a motion to dismiss)
A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (assumes student may have a limited contractual interest in school property)
Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (upheld trespass conviction while assuming limited student interest)
State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008) (courts may dismiss charges where prosecution would violate constitutional rights, but such claims must be properly presented)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parents have recognized rights to make decisions concerning care, custody, and control of their children)