Jennifer Heglund v. City of Grand Rapids
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17273
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Jennifer and Jamie Heglund discovered via a 2013 audit that Jennifer’s motor-vehicle records had been accessed hundreds of times; one access on March 25, 2010 was traced to the Grand Rapids Police Department.
- The Heglunds sued in January 2014 under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and § 1983, naming numerous entities and hundreds of John/Jane Doe defendants; many claims were dismissed as time-barred.
- After discovery, Grand Rapids identified Frank Scherf as the officer who accessed Jennifer’s record; the Heglunds moved in March 2015 to amend and substitute Scherf for a John Doe, which the district court allowed.
- Grand Rapids and Scherf then moved for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds; the district court held the amendment did not "relate back" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) because naming a John Doe was not a “mistake,” and granted summary judgment (alternatively finding insufficient DPPA proof).
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed, addressing standing, equitable estoppel, and whether a John Doe pleading constitutes a Rule 15(c) “mistake.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to sue under DPPA | Heglund: invasion-of-privacy from improper access is a concrete, cognizable intangible harm | Scherf/Grand Rapids: statutory violation and alleged anxiety are not concrete injuries | Held: Plaintiff has standing; privacy interest is rooted in common law and DPPA protects such harms |
| Equitable estoppel to overcome statute of limitations | Heglund: discovery delay and defendants’ conduct (motions, DPS responses) prevented earlier identification of Scherf | Defendants: no misleading affirmative conduct by Grand Rapids; delays not attributable to them | Held: Equitable estoppel does not apply; filing motions to dismiss and unrelated DPS delay insufficient to mislead |
| Relation back under Rule 15(c) when replacing a John Doe with a named defendant | Heglund: lack of knowledge of defendant’s identity is a “mistake,” so amendment should relate back | Scherf/Grand Rapids: naming John Doe was an intentional statement of ignorance, not a mistake; Rule 15(c) requires an unintentional error | Held: Naming a John Doe is not a “mistake” under Rule 15(c); amendment does not relate back, so claim is time-barred |
| Merits of DPPA claim (alternative ruling) | Heglund: Scherf’s access violated DPPA; city vicariously liable | Scherf/Grand Rapids: on summary judgment, plaintiff failed to create genuine issue of material fact | Held (alternative): Even if timely, Heglund failed to show genuine dispute on DPPA violation; summary judgment proper |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonough v. Anoka County, 799 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015) (statute-of-limitations framework for DPPA claims)
- Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016) (standing analysis for intangible harms under Spokeo)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (requirement that injury-in-fact be concrete and particularized)
- Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010) (relation-back inquiry focuses on what prospective defendant knew or should have known)
- Hayes v. Faulkner County, 388 F.3d 669 (8th Cir. 2004) (Rule 15(c) relation-back principles)
- Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) (Congressional recognition of privacy harms addressed by DPPA)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing doctrine; Congress may elevate intangible harms into legally cognizable injuries)