Jenkins v. United States
102 Fed. Cl. 598
Fed. Cl.2011Background
- This class action involves landowners asserting a Fifth Amendment taking due to converting the Perry Subdivision rail corridor in Dallas County, Iowa, to a recreational trail under railbanking.
- The Des Moines Valley segment (Waukee to Perry) was originally operated by Des Moines Valley Railroad; a second segment (Perry to Dawson) by Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul; 241 parcels are affected.
- Plaintiffs claim ownership of a reversionary interest in the rail-right-of-way easements, which the government allegedly foreclosed by approving interim trail use under the Trails Act.
- A National Trails System Act Amendment (1983) NITU authorized interim trail use and railbanking, with jurisdiction retained by the STB during negotiations.
- The NITU here authorized interim trail use with the Foundation as trail operator and Union Pacific as the selling railroad, creating a railbanking/trail-use framework.
- The government moved for summary judgment arguing deeded easements were unlimited and condemned easements limited to railroad purposes; the court held deeded easements are limited to railroad purposes under Iowa law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of deeded easements under Iowa law | Des Moines Valley deeds restricted to railroad purposes. | Deeds are unlimited and allow trail use. | Deeded easements are limited to railroad purposes. |
| Scope of taking liability after NITU | Taking includes railbanking and trail use as foreseen consequences of the NITU. | Taking liability limited to railbanking under the NITU. | Taking extends to foreseeable consequences, including trail use under the NITU. |
| accrual versus scope arguments under Federal Circuit precedents | Accrual precedents do not limit ultimate scope of liability. | Ladd and related cases cap liability post-accrual to certain aspects. | Accrual does not cap the full scope of liability; foreseeability governs scope. |
Key Cases Cited
- Preseault v. United States, 494 U.S. 1, 494 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1990) (trail use and railbanking preserved; takings principle clarified)
- Preseault II, 100 F.3d 1525, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (scope of easements; identifying three key questions for takings)
- Macy Elevator, Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 708, 97 Fed.Cl. 708 (Fed.Cl. 2011) (Trails Act framework and railbanking described)
- Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (NITU as trigger for takings; accrual discussed)
- Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed.Cir. 2010) (accrual date; taking elements may precede full development)
- Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (foreseeable consequences liability; rails-to-trails framework)
- Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (accrual and scope in railbanking contexts)
- Rockafellow v. Lihs, 494 N.W.2d 734, 494 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (deed scope limited to railroad uses in Iowa context)
- Macerich Real Estate Co. v. City of Ames, 433 N.W.2d 726, 433 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 1988) (deed language implying railroad-purpose easement)
- Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 325 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1982) (easement for uses connected with railroad)