Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81

Background

Early Aug. 6, 2014 home invasion in Gwinnett County: intruders forced entry, shot and killed Adam Schrier; two others (including an 8-year-old) were shot and bound; victims robbed of cash.
Appellant Devon Jenkins identified at scene, seen carrying a gun and duffel at a pre-raid hotel meeting, later made incriminating admissions to acquaintances and a cellmate, and a cigarette in the getaway truck yielded his DNA.
The break-in grew out of a meth-trafficking dispute; co-conspirators planned to steal drugs/money they believed were at Schrier’s home.
Jenkins was tried, convicted of felony murder and related offenses including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and sentenced to life without parole plus 50 years; he appealed.
On appeal Jenkins raised three principal claims: (1) insufficiency of evidence for felon-in-possession because the stipulation did not specify timing of the prior felony; (2) erroneous admission of testimony about Jenkins’s conduct at a late-August roadblock (alleged Rule 404(b) other-act evidence); and (3) ineffective assistance for failing to request a limiting instruction on that evidence.

Issues

Issue	Jenkins' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of felon-in-possession element (timing of prior conviction)	The stipulation that Jenkins was a convicted felon was in present tense and did not prove he was a felon on Aug. 6, 2014, leaving reasonable doubt on the §16-11-131 element.	The parties stipulated to felony status to obviate further proof; jury was instructed and nothing suggested the conviction post-dated the crime, so a rational juror could infer timing.	Affirmed: stipulation and jury instruction permitted jury to accept felony status as an existing fact; evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia.
Admissibility of roadblock/chase testimony (Rule 404(b) and Rule 403)	The late-August roadblock conduct was impermissible other-act/character evidence and highly prejudicial; unrelated to charged offenses.	The conduct was intrinsic as flight — admissible to show consciousness of guilt and awareness of being wanted; probative value outweighed prejudice.	Affirmed: evidence admissible as intrinsic flight evidence, not subject to Rule 404(b); trial court did not abuse discretion under Rule 403; any error harmless given other strong evidence.
Ineffective assistance for not requesting limiting instruction	Trial counsel should have requested a limiting instruction that the roadblock evidence was admitted only to show flight.	No deficient performance because the evidence was admissible intrinsic evidence and a limiting instruction likely would not have been ordered.	Affirmed denial of ineffective-assistance claim: failure to request the limiting instruction was not shown to be prejudicial under Strickland.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (constitutional sufficiency standard for conviction)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209 (flight evidence admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt)
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474 (tests for intrinsic evidence: same transaction, complete story, or inextricably intertwined)
State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729 (flight/consciousness-of-guilt principles and Rule 403 guidance)
United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318 (flight as admission by conduct; caution on time delay)
McKie v. State, 306 Ga. 111 (standard for rejecting reasonable hypothesis of innocence)
Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298 (failure to request an instruction does not establish ineffective assistance where the instruction would not have been given)
Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134 (harmless-error standard for nonconstitutional error)