537 S.W.3d 696
Tex. App.2017Background
- Deondre Javqueen Jenkins was tried and convicted (25 years) for continuous trafficking of persons based on a charging instrument whose only mention of his name appeared in the caption.
- The body of the indictment used the term "defendant" and did not expressly name a person after the statutory commencement or before the statutory conclusion.
- Jenkins did not move to quash or dismiss before trial; he raised the constitutional defect on the second day of trial and the trial court denied dismissal.
- Jenkins appealed, arguing the charging instrument failed the Texas Constitution’s definition of an "indictment" because it did not charge "a person," thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction.
- The State argued Jenkins waived the defect under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.14(b) by not objecting before trial.
- The appellate court concluded the charging instrument failed to charge "a person," so it was not a constitutional indictment, did not vest jurisdiction, and Jenkins’s conviction is void; the case was remanded with instruction to dismiss the indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jenkins) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a charging instrument that names the accused only in the caption (not in the body) satisfies art. V, § 12(b)’s requirement that an indictment charge "a person" | The indictment did not name a person; caption is not part of the indictment; therefore it failed the constitutional definition and deprived the court of jurisdiction | The defect was waivable under art. 1.14(b) because Jenkins did not object before trial; the indictment as a whole showed the State intended to charge him | Held for Jenkins: caption is not part of the indictment; instrument failed to charge "a person," so it was not a constitutional indictment and did not vest jurisdiction; conviction void |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (standard: sufficiency of indictment reviewed de novo)
- Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (post‑1985 statutes make many indictment defects waivable if not raised pretrial)
- Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (constitutional definition requires an indictment to charge a person; failure to do so deprives court of jurisdiction and is not waivable)
- Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (interpreting Studer and Cook; assess indictment as a whole to determine if it charges an offense sufficient to vest jurisdiction)
- Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (an instrument is an indictment if it identifies the penal statute and shows intent to prosecute that offense)
- Ex parte Patterson, 902 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (indictment that charged only "Defendant" did not satisfy constitutional requirement to charge a person)
- Stansbury v. State, 82 S.W.2d 962 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935) (caption is not part of the indictment proper)