Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506

Jenkins was convicted in 1995 of malice murders, kidnappings with bodily injury, armed robbery of two victims, and theft of $600; the jury recommended two death sentences for the murders and the trial court imposed them, which this Court later affirmed.
The habeas corpus proceeding vacated Jenkins’s death sentences and convictions after finding he was 17 at the time of the crimes, citing Roper v. Simmons; the Warden did not appeal the ruling, and Jenkins is no longer subject to those sentences.
The habeas court also found ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel conflict, and prosecutorial misconduct, prompting a new trial order; the Warden appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment ordering a new trial.
On June 27, 2011, Jenkins moved to dismiss the indictment and for a plea in bar on double jeopardy and speedy-trial grounds; additional motions followed in 2012 and 2013, with the trial court denying them.
Jenkins contends retrial would violate double jeopardy due to prosecutorial misconduct; he also contends retrial would violate federal and state speedy-trial guarantees.
The Court independently reviews legal conclusions while evaluating factual findings for clear error; it rejects Jenkins’s interpretation of double jeopardy and analyzes the speedy-trial claim under Barker v. Wingo, applying a threshold prejudicial-delay inquiry followed by the four-factor balance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether retrial violates double jeopardy	Jenkins argues prosecutorial misconduct tainted the trial, warranting discharge.	Jenkins argues retrial would violate double jeopardy due to misconduct aimed at subverting protections.	No; retrial is not barred by double jeopardy.
Whether delay in retrial violated speedy-trial rights	Jenkins asserts substantial delay burdens him in violation of speedy-trial guarantees.	State contends Barker v. Wingo balance supports denying relief given various delays and causes.	No; Barker v. Wingo balance supports denial of speedy-trial relief.

D’Auria v. State, 229 Ga. App. 34 (Ga. App. 1997) (double jeopardy limits on retrial after prosecutorial misconduct)
Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7 (Ga. 2010) (double jeopardy and multiple protections against trial abuses)
Roscoe v. State, 286 Ga. 325 (Ga. 2009) (restricts expansive use of double jeopardy as exclusionary rule)
Dinning v. State, 267 Ga. 879 (Ga. 1997) (prosecutorial misconduct may require mistrial; retrial barred if misconduct intended to secure retrial)
Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588 (Ga. 2012) (assignment of delay and blame between State and defense in Barker analysis)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
Brock v. State, 293 Ga. 156 (Ga. 2013) (prejudice assessment in speedy-trial delay; time burdens)
State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674 (Ga. 2011) (heavily weights defendant's assertion of speedy-trial right when applicable)
State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524 (Ga. 2011) (Barker analysis framework and balancing guidance)
State v. Buckner, 292 Ga. 390 (Ga. 2013) (balancing factors and no abuse of discretion in Barker application)
State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31 (Ga. 2012) (standard of review for trial court factual and legal determinations)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (juvenile death penalty hostility under Eighth Amendment)
Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588 (Ga. 2012) (threshold prejudicial delay timing in Barker analysis)