Jenkins v. State
303 Ga. 314
| Ga. | 2018Background
- On Nov. 11, 2012, Clarence Jenkins shot his 22-year-old son, Chavarious, during a confrontation in Jenkins’s home; Chavarious died two days later from a head wound.
- Witnesses (Karl Cotton and Latrece Whitfield) described an argument, a physical scuffle, Jenkins returning with a handgun, a close-range shot, and Jenkins placing the pistol on a counter afterward.
- Jenkins told a responding officer shortly after the incident that he had been showing his son the gun and it discharged accidentally; the trial court excluded that statement as hearsay not falling within the excited-utterance exception.
- Jenkins was convicted by a jury of felony murder (during aggravated assault and aggravated battery), aggravated assault/battery (merged or vacated), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault and aggravated battery; he received life plus consecutive five-year terms for each possession count.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions but held the two firearm-possession convictions merged because they were based on the same victim and incident, vacated one five-year sentence, and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Jenkins's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for convictions | Evidence insufficient (implicitly) | Evidence supported convictions beyond reasonable doubt | Court affirmed sufficiency (Jackson standard) |
| Admissibility of Jenkins’s statement to officer (excited utterance) | Statement admissible as OCGA § 24-8-803(2) excited utterance | Statement was hearsay not covered by excited-utterance exception | Trial court did not abuse discretion excluding statement; admission would not meet excited-utterance criteria |
| Merger of two firearm-possession convictions | Sentences should not both stand because same victim/event | Possession counts support separate sentences | Possession counts merged; one five-year sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing on one count at trial court’s discretion |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to object to jury charge (requested prior-statement instruction) | Counsel deficient for not objecting; prejudice resulted | Counsel reasonably believed instruction given covered the requested language; no prejudice shown | No relief: performance not shown prejudicial; no reasonable probability of different outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (explains rationale for excited-utterance hearsay exception)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel two-prong test)
- United States v. Sewell, 90 F.3d 326 (discusses stress-of-excitement rationale for excited utterances)
- Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 268 (Georgia merger doctrine for overlapping firearm-possession counts)
- Gibbs v. State, 295 Ga. 92 (merger principles for related offenses)
- Tye v. State, 298 Ga. 474 (remand for resentencing when allied/merged counts exist)
- Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389 (standard of review for evidentiary rulings under new Evidence Code)
- Robbins v. State, 300 Ga. 387 (application of excited-utterance doctrine in Georgia)
- Redding v. State, 297 Ga. 845 (limits on claiming trial tactics as ineffective assistance)
- Mullins v. State, 299 Ga. 681 (no reversible error from jury-charge issue absent prejudice)
- Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706 (assessing prejudice from alleged trial error)
- Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75 (appellate review deference to trial court factual findings)