Jenkins v. Starns
2012 La. LEXIS 105
La.2012Background
- Laurie Jenkins hired Starns to represent her in a Medlock breach-of-contract case regarding a $25,000 metal building, with disputed final payment.
- A default judgment was entered against Jenkins in January 2007 after Medlock obtained a preliminary default and she and Starns did not appear at a hearing on the declinatory exceptions.
- Jenkins later sued Starns for legal malpractice, alleging failure to file a responsive pleading and to defend at the April 16, 2007 hearing, resulting in garnishment and damages.
- Starns argued Jenkins’ legal-malpractice claim was untimely under La. R.S. 9:5605, which creates one-year and three-year peremptive periods; the filing occurred November 5, 2008.
- The trial court and court of appeal applied the continuous representation rule (contra non valentem) to suspend the commencement of the one-year peremptive period, citing Hendrick and Lima.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the continuous representation rule cannot suspend the peremptive periods in 9:5605, and that discovery occurred in January 2007, making the November 2008 suit untimely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can continuous representation suspend 9:5605 peremption? | Jenkins argues the rule delays peremption while attorney remedies the act. | Starns argues peremption cannot be suspended by contra non valentem. | No; continuous representation cannot suspend the one-year peremptive period. |
| When does discovery trigger 9:5605 peremption in legal malpractice? | Jenkins claims discovery occurred later, within one year of filing. | Starns claims discovery began in January 2007 when the default was noticed. | Discovery began January 2007, initiating the one-year peremptive period. |
| Are 9:5605's time limits truly peremptive and not subject to suspension? | Jenkins relies on equitable fairness to extend time via continuous representation. | Starns asserts the statute’s language makes the periods peremptive and interruptible only by legislative change. | Yes; both one-year and three-year periods are peremptive and cannot be suspended. |
| Is Reeder/Naghi controlling to bar application of continuous representation to peremption? | Jenkins argues these cases should permit equity via discovery-like exceptions. | Starns contends Reeder/Naghi foreclose any suspension of peremption by contra non valentem. | Yes; Reeder/Naghi control and foreclose suspension of peremption by continuous representation. |
| Does the relation back or amended pleading concept affect peremptive timing here? | N/A | N/A | Not applicable to the peremptive framework; the court treats 9:5605 as peremptive regardless of amendments. |
Key Cases Cited
- Naghi v. Brener, 17 So. 3d 919 (La. 2009) (one-year and three-year periods are peremptive; amended pleading relation back does not defeat peremption)
- Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1997) (continuous representation cannot suspend peremptive periods)
- Teague v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 1266 (La. 2008) (interprets discovery rule for peremption; peremption commences when facts show a valid malpractice claim)
- Hendrick v. ABC Insurance Co., 787 So. 2d 283 (La. 2001) (recognizes contra non valentem but distinguishes peremption from prescription)
- Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624 (La. 1992) (continuous representation as a suspension principle under prescription context)
- Carter v. Haygood, 892 So. 2d 1261 (La. 2005) (discusses contra non valentem in medical context; not controlling for peremption)