Jenkins v. Housing Court Department, 16 F.4th 8

Hector Jenkins, a Black, Costa Rica–born Housing Specialist in Boston Housing Court for 23+ years, repeatedly complained about the 2005 appointment of Michael Neville as Chief Housing Specialist and other court practices.
Jenkins was warned to stop sending lengthy, repeated complaint emails and instructed to use internal channels; he continued to email staff and supervisors.
After two administrative leaves and an eight‑month investigation, a disciplinary hearing found Jenkins insubordinate and recommended termination; Chief Justice Sullivan fired him in July 2016.
Jenkins sued pro se in federal court alleging § 1983, Title VII (retaliation and hostile work environment), Title VI, and later sought to add ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims; the district court dismissed or struck most counts and left only a Title VII retaliation claim, later granting summary judgment to the Trial Court.
On appeal, Jenkins challenged (1) summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation claim, (2) dismissal of his Title VII hostile‑work‑environment claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and (3) denial of leave to amend to add a § 504 Rehabilitation Act claim; the First Circuit affirmed on all three grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Title VII retaliation: Did Jenkins show pretext to survive summary judgment?	Jenkins argued termination was retaliation for protected complaints and that disciplining the manner of complaints could mask retaliatory motive.	Trial Court argued it terminated Jenkins for insubordination and repeated refusal to follow directives about complaint procedures.	Affirmed for defendant: record shows neutral, nonpretextual reasons (insubordination, repeated warnings, refusal to accept direction).
Title VII hostile work environment: Was the claim exhausted administratively?	Jenkins contended he provided the FAC to the EEOC with his first charge, so EEOC had notice of hostile‑environment allegations.	Trial Court argued the EEOC charge focused on retaliation/termination and would not reasonably be put on notice to investigate a hostile‑environment claim from the FAC.	Affirmed for defendant: Jenkins failed to show the EEOC was reasonably put on notice of a hostile‑work‑environment claim.
Leave to amend to add Rehabilitation Act claim: Was denial an abuse of discretion?	Jenkins argued denial was wrongful and the proposed § 504 claim should have been allowed.	Trial Court argued amendment was untimely and futile; district court found undue delay and lack of diligence.	Affirmed for defendant: denial upheld for undue delay/lack of diligence (and futility alternative not reached).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination/retaliation claims)
Mesnick v. Gen. Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991) (explains employer's production burden and that complainant is not immune from discipline for inappropriate conduct)
Calero‑Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 355 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (plaintiff must point to specific facts showing sham or pretext)
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (employer's legitimate reasons can be upheld even if plaintiff shows their conduct was motivated by discrimination)
Velazquez‑Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2011) (summary judgment review and scope of administrative exhaustion)
Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996) (purpose of EEOC exhaustion: notice and conciliation)
Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (scope of judicial complaint limited by EEOC charge and investigation)
Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1990) (investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC charge limits subsequent federal claims)
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure to develop argument on appeal results in waiver)