Jenkins v. County of Washington
697 F. App'x 102
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Peddie Jenkins, pro se, sued multiple county, municipal, and state defendants; the district court entered judgment for defendants and dismissed Jenkins' complaint.
- Jenkins filed a notice of appeal after the 30-day deadline and later moved for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and for leave to amend his complaint.
- The district court denied Jenkins' Rule 60(b)(5) motion and his motion for leave to amend; Jenkins then appealed both the dismissal and the Rule 60(b) denial.
- Jenkins argued (for the first time on appeal) that the district judge should have recused himself because of local ties and prior prosecutorial experience.
- The Second Circuit considered whether Jenkins' appeal was timely (and thus whether it had jurisdiction), and whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(5) relief, leave to amend, or recusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / Appellate jurisdiction | Jenkins contends the appeal should be heard despite filing after 30 days because he later moved under Rule 60(b) | Defendants argue the notice of appeal was untimely and no timely Rule 60(b) tolling was filed | Appeal from judgment dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because no Rule 60(b) motion was filed within 28 days to toll the 30-day appeal period |
| Rule 60(b)(5) relief | Jenkins sought relief under Rule 60(b)(5) and leave to amend | Defendants argued the judgment was final, not prospective, and relief was not warranted | Denial of Rule 60(b)(5) and leave to amend affirmed; judgment was final and not eligible for prospective relief |
| Leave to amend complaint | Jenkins argued he should be allowed to amend after dismissal | Defendants opposed amendment and the district court found no basis | Denial affirmed for abuse-of-discretion review; no abuse found |
| Judge recusal | Jenkins asserted judge should recuse due to local birthplace and former prosecutor role | Defendants noted recusal not raised below and facts do not show disqualifying bias | Recusal claim rejected; raised first on appeal and insufficient to show objective grounds for recusal |
Key Cases Cited
- Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc., 802 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2015) (timeliness and waiver principles for Rule 60 motions and appeals)
- Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2016) (Rule 60(b)(5) applies only where judgment has prospective application)
- Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (standard of review for Rule 60(b) denials)
- Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion review for leave to amend and Rule 60 motions)
- Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008) (standards for amendment and post-judgment relief)
- LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1995) (abandonment of issues and appellate briefing)
- Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusal to entertain issues raised first on appeal)
- Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (recusal standard from objective observer perspective)
- United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1992) (recusal analysis and standards)