Jenkins v. Chicago Pacific Corp.
113104
| Kan. | Oct 27, 2017Background
- In 1886 grantors deeded a 350-foot-wide strip (described by centerline and feet on either side) and various town lots to the Chicago, Kansas and Nebraska Railway Co.; the deed used language like "over, across, and through" and "to have and to hold . . . forever."
- A railroad was later operated on the strip, then the railway was abandoned; successors quitclaimed any interest to Dirt & Gravel, which in 1994 quitclaimed to Jenkins, who described the property as the abandoned railroad right-of-way.
- Jenkins sued in 2010 to quiet title, claiming fee simple from the quitclaim or title by adverse possession; four abutting landowners counterclaimed that the 1886 deed conveyed only a railroad right-of-way easement that reverted on abandonment.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding the 1886 deed conveyed only an easement and that the railroad (having abandoned) had no fee to convey to Jenkins; the court allocated parcels to abutters and reserved two partial lots.
- Jenkins filed a notice of appeal before the district court entered a K.S.A. 60-254(b) certification; the district court certified the judgment four weeks later and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction from premature notice filed before 60-254(b) certification | Jenkins contended the appeal should proceed; notice filed before certification should not defeat appeal | Defendants implied certification was required for finality and appealability | Court held later district-court certification cured the premature notice because certification occurred before dismissal, so appellate jurisdiction is proper |
| Whether the 1886 deed conveyed fee simple or only an easement (right-of-way) | Jenkins argued deed language ("to have and to hold . . . forever") and warranty covenants show fee simple title | Defendants argued deed’s description by centerline, fixed feet on each side, and prior staking/survey show conveyance for right-of-way only, thus an easement reverting on abandonment | Court held deed demonstrates conveyance for railroad right-of-way; only an easement was conveyed and it reverted on abandonment |
| Whether Stone precludes considering extrinsic evidence or implied use when deed language could be read in fee-simple terms | Jenkins argued Stone mandates treating unambiguous deed language as fee and prohibits parol evidence to imply use restriction | Defendants relied on precedent distinguishing deeds that describe strips by centerline where implied railroad use is apparent, allowing consideration of context | Court distinguished Stone (which involved purely metes-and-bounds, unambiguous deed) and allowed consideration of the deed’s descriptive language and context; Stone does not control here |
| Whether Schoenberger compels fee simple (similar strip description conveyed fee in that case) | Jenkins argued Schoenberger’s 500-foot strip was treated as fee, so her similarly-described strip should be fee | Defendants noted different extrinsic facts (e.g., prior condemnation and existing track in Schoenberger) and emphasized full deed language here implies railroad use | Court rejected Jenkins’ reliance on Schoenberger due to differing facts and affirmed that the 1886 deed implies railroad use and conveyed only an easement |
Key Cases Cited
- Stone v. U.S.D. 222, 278 Kan. 166 (2004) (railroad may hold fee when deed is unambiguous by metes-and-bounds; parol evidence not admitted to create right-of-way restriction)
- Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 189 Kan. 536 (1962) (established rule that deeds conveying strips for railroad rights-of-way generally vest only easements; public policy supports stability of title)
- Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538 (1905) (warranty deed conveying strip for railroad right-of-way conveys only an easement that reverts on abandonment)
- Ullery v. Othick, 304 Kan. 405 (2016) (district court may certify a partial summary-judgment order under K.S.A. 60-254(b) after the summary judgment has been entered)
- Schoenberger v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 29 Kan. App. 2d 245 (2000) (Court of Appeals treated certain conveyances as fee in context of prior condemnation and existing track; distinguished on facts)