Jenkins v. Bergeron, 67 F. Supp. 3d 472

Background

In April 2003 Shaun Jenkins was indicted in Massachusetts for the 2003 murder of his cousin Stephen; convicted of first‑degree murder in April 2005 and sentenced to life.
Massachusetts Superior Court denied a new trial motion; the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the conviction in February 2011.
Jenkins filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in September 2012 asserting: (1) he did not validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to testify, (2) trial counsel was ineffective, and (3) the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The SJC found Jenkins knowingly waived the right to testify, rejected his ineffective‑assistance claims, and found no Brady violation regarding changed grand jury testimony.
The federal district court applied AEDPA deference to the SJC’s merits adjudication and denied the habeas petition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jenkins validly waived his right to testify	Jenkins says counsel unilaterally prevented him from testifying so any waiver was not knowing/voluntary	Commonwealth/SJC: record shows Jenkins discussed decision with counsel, judge conducted colloquy, Jenkins acknowledged understanding	Denied — SJC reasonably found an informed, voluntary waiver; AEDPA deference applies
Whether counsel was ineffective for advising Jenkins not to testify	Jenkins: counsel’s reasons were unreasonable and deprived him of jury sympathy; prejudice likely	Commonwealth/SJC: counsel had reasonable strategic reasons; testimony would not have overcome strong contrary evidence	Denied — SJC’s miscarriage‑of‑justice analysis was reasonable and not contrary to Strickland
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach key witness Craig adequately	Jenkins: counsel should have used grand jury testimony, full criminal history, and inconsistent statements to impeach Craig; cumulative effect would have mattered	Commonwealth/SJC: selective impeachment was reasonable; grand jury testimony contained damaging material; one conviction sufficed; cumulative effect unlikely to change outcome	Denied — SJC reasonably concluded no deficient performance causing prejudice
Whether prosecution violated Brady by not disclosing changed grand jury testimony	Jenkins: discrepancy between grand jury and trial testimony about a post‑murder phone remark was exculpatory and should have been disclosed	Commonwealth/SJC: no evidence prosecutor knew witness would change testimony or that testimony was false; no suppression shown	Denied — no evidence prosecutor knew of perjury and no Brady suppression established

Key Cases Cited

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (limits federal habeas review of state‑law claims)
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (state‑court factual findings entitled to presumption of correctness)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" framework)
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (waiver must be knowing and voluntary)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (presumption that state court adjudicated presented federal claims on the merits)
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (right to testify is fundamental)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong ineffective assistance test)
Brady v. Maryland, 371 U.S. 812 (prosecutorial suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (Brady materiality and knowledge principles)
Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29 (failure to assert right to testify waives it)
U.S. v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545 (waiver presumed from failure to notify court of desire to testify)
Thompson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614 (no clear Supreme Court standard on waiver to testify)
Mello v. DiPaulo, 295 F.3d 137 (state "miscarriage of justice" standard at least as favorable as Strickland)
Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d 67 (deference to state courts under AEDPA in ineffective assistance review)
Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6 (standards for evaluating counsel performance)
U.S. v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018 (inconsistencies in testimony do not alone show prosecutor knew testimony was false)