Jenkins v. Astrue
3:12-cv-00274
M.D. Penn.Oct 30, 2013Background
- This is a district court review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a Social Security disability denial.
- Jenkins, administratrix of the estate of Leo Jenkins, sued after Jenkins died in 2010 challenging the denial.
- The ALJ found Jenkins capable of sedentary work and denied benefits on September 14, 2009.
- The medical record showed multi-level lumbar disc herniations with left-sided nerve compression.
- MRI evidence and treating physician opinions suggested greater functional limitation than the ALJ credited.
- Court remands to the Commissioner for further consideration of the medical evidence and credibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ properly evaluated MRI evidence and credibility | Jenkins contends the MRI showed nerve compression the ALJ misread | Colvin argues the ALJ's credibility assessment was supported by the record | Remand for proper consideration of MRI findings and credibility |
| Whether urination frequency evidence undermines sedentary-work RFC | Jenkins' urination symptoms were not properly accommodated | No supportive medical evidence for two times per hour urination | Remand to address MRI interpretation and symptom evidence |
| Whether medical opinions (Dr. Argires, others) were properly weighed | Treating sources supported greater restrictions | The ALJ did not abuse the weight given to medical opinions | Remand to reassess medical opinions in light of MRI data |
Key Cases Cited
- Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (substantial evidence standard guidance)
- Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (standard for substantial evidence in administrative decisions)
- Brown v. Lindenthal, 845 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describes substantial evidence threshold)
- Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1990) (courts should not substitute lay medical inference for expert opinion)
- Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security, 474 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2007) (explains five-step evaluation and burden-shifting)
