Jeisson Uribe v. Jefferson Sessions III
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7863
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Jeisson Humberto Uribe, a Colombian national and lawful permanent resident since 2000, was convicted in Maryland of (1) theft (misdemeanor) in 2011 and (2) third-degree burglary (felony) in 2013.
- DHS charged Uribe with removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony) and § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (two crimes involving moral turpitude).
- The IJ dismissed the aggravated-felony charge but found both convictions to be crimes involving moral turpitude, sustaining removability under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
- The BIA affirmed the IJ, agreeing that breaking and entering a dwelling violates privacy/security expectations and risks confrontation, and therefore is morally turpitudinous.
- On appeal, Uribe challenged only whether Maryland third-degree burglary categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude; the Fourth Circuit reviewed that legal question de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Maryland third-degree burglary is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) | Uribe: statute covers unoccupied or constructively entered dwellings, boats/vehicles, and crimes where the intended underlying offense may not involve moral turpitude, so it does not necessarily involve moral turpitude | Government/BIA: statute criminalizes breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit any crime, which inherently violates expectations of privacy/security and risks confrontation, thus is morally turpitudinous | Held: Yes. Maryland third-degree burglary categorically involves moral turpitude; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. 2014) (defines moral turpitude as conduct that shocks the public conscience)
- Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2017) (categorical-elemental approach and de novo review of moral-turpitude question)
- Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015) (consideration of both IJ and BIA opinions when BIA adopts and supplements IJ reasoning)
- Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (Chevron deference to BIA’s reasonable interpretations)
- Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) (agency deference principles)
- Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2001) (Chevron deference context)
- Hobby v. State, 83 A.3d 794 (Md. 2014) (Maryland law: constructive breaking and factors for dwelling status)
- McKenzie v. State, 962 A.2d 998 (Md. 2008) (Maryland law: vacant but suitable premises can be dwellings)
- United States v. Henriquez, 757 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2014) (boats and vehicles can be dwellings under Maryland burglary law)