Jeffry R. Dickerson v. State
228 So. 3d 658
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant Jeffry Roy Dickerson was convicted of aggravated stalking, burglary of a dwelling, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault involving his ex-wife; conviction reversed on appeal.
- Before trial, the State filed a Williams-rule notice to admit evidence of similar misconduct by a different ex-wife at a pretrial Williams-rule hearing.
- Dickerson’s counsel moved to withdraw the day before the hearing; counsel’s motion was granted and the court asked Dickerson whether he wanted to proceed and he said he would hire a lawyer but had none yet and then agreed to proceed without counsel.
- The court conducted the Williams-rule hearing without performing a Faretta colloquy or making findings about whether Dickerson’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent; both ex-wives then testified.
- On appeal Dickerson argued the court’s failure to conduct the required Faretta inquiry before allowing him to represent himself at the Williams-rule hearing — a critical stage — was per se reversible error.
Issues
| Issue | Dickerson's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by permitting Dickerson to proceed without counsel at a pretrial Williams-rule hearing without conducting a Faretta inquiry | Failure to conduct Faretta colloquy rendered waiver invalid and is per se reversible error | Court did not need a Faretta colloquy; Williams hearing not a crucial stage or Dickerson was sufficiently sophisticated | Reversed: Faretta colloquy required before allowing self-representation at that Williams-rule hearing; error is per se reversible |
| Whether a Williams-rule hearing is a "crucial stage" requiring right to counsel | Williams-rule hearing can significantly affect outcome; therefore counsel right attaches | Williams-rule hearing is not necessarily a crucial stage in all cases | Held that the Williams-rule hearing here was a crucial stage because the proffered similar-act evidence could significantly affect the outcome |
| Whether an on-the-record waiver inquiry can be satisfied by brief sworn affirmation under oath | Brief sworn assent is insufficient absent full Faretta inquiry and factual findings | Dickerson was knowledgeable and sophisticated; formal colloquy unnecessary (citing narrow exceptions) | Court rejected State’s argument: record lacked findings to support exception; formal inquiry required |
| Whether the Faretta violation is subject to harmless-error analysis | N/A | N/A | Per precedent, Faretta violations of this type are per se reversible and not subject to harmless-error review |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959) (authorizing admission of similar-act evidence)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (defendant has right to self-representation; court must ensure waiver is knowing and intelligent)
- Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 2008) (explaining Faretta waiver hearing requirement)
- Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1996) (codification and explanation of Rule 3.111(d) waiver process)
- McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2011) (failure to hold Faretta hearing after unequivocal request is per se reversible)
- Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992) (defendant entitled to counsel at each crucial stage)
- Kearse v. State, 858 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (pretrial suppression hearing is a crucial stage requiring waiver inquiry)
- Davis v. State, 10 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (narrow exceptions to waiver-hearing requirement exist but require factual findings)
- Laramee v. State, 90 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (Faretta error not subject to harmless-error review)