Jeffrey Wayne Burns v. Elisa J. Burns (now Weber)
16-1141
| W. Va. | Jan 5, 2018Background
- Jeffrey Burns and Elisa Burns divorced in 1996; divorce decree (by agreement) required Jeffrey to pay $600 annually into a trust for the parties’ child’s post‑high‑school education from 1997 for 17 years.
- Jeffrey made none of the required annual payments; the total principal due is $10,200.
- The child turned 18 in 2013, later enrolled in vocational school in 2015 and incurred tuition; Elisa demanded the missed payments in February 2016.
- Elisa filed a contempt petition; the family court entered a decretal judgment for $10,200 plus interest from Feb. 1, 2016.
- Jeffrey appealed to the circuit court, arguing the trust‑fund provision must be vacated under W. Va. Code § 48‑11‑103(c)(3) and (5) (statutory reenactment limits) and that Shortt v. Damron is inapplicable; the circuit court affirmed and Jeffrey appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: statutory provisions cited by Jeffrey did not apply to a provision that was part of a voluntary divorce agreement entered in 1996, and the decretal judgment was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Burns) | Defendant's Argument (Weber) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 48‑11‑103(c)(5) (orders entered after Mar. 14, 1994) vacates the 1996 trust‑fund provision | The divorce order was entered after Mar. 14, 1994, so subsection (5) vacates the post‑high‑school educational award | The provision was part of the parties’ voluntary agreement in 1996 and not governed by the § 48‑11‑103(c) savings clause for pre‑1994 orders | Held: (Affirmed) § 48‑11‑103(c)(5) applies only to orders entered under the prior (1993) statute; it does not invalidate a voluntary 1996 agreement producing a court order |
| Whether § 48‑11‑103(c)(3) (child <16 at time of order) vacates the 1996 provision | The child was under 16 when the 1996 order was entered, so subsection (3) requires vacation of the educational award | The statutory savings provision refers only to orders entered under the prior statute; the 1996 order was under the current enactment and the parties contracted to provide post‑majority support | Held: (Affirmed) § 48‑11‑103(c)(3) does not apply to the 1996 agreement/order; the agreement to pay remains enforceable |
| Whether a court may enforce a voluntary divorce‑agreement obligation for post‑majority educational expenses (and whether Shortt applies) | Shortt inapplicability argued; Jeffrey contends the decree cannot be enforced against him under current law | Weber argues parties may contract for post‑majority support; Shortt supports enforcement of an agreed obligation despite statutory changes | Held: (Affirmed) Parties may contract to provide support after legal capacity; Shortt remains applicable as precedent supporting enforcement of voluntary agreements; the decretal judgment for principal plus interest was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Shortt v. Damron, 220 W. Va. 710, 649 S.E.2d 283 (W. Va. 2007) (upholds enforceability of a voluntary divorce agreement to pay college expenses; parents may contract to support children after majority)
- In re S.H., 237 W. Va. 626, 789 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 2016) (articulates standard of review applied to circuit court findings and conclusions)
- Walker v. W. Va. Ethics Comm'n, 201 W. Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1997) (explains the two‑prong deferential standard of review noted by the Court)