Jeffrey Rutledge v. International Longshoremens As
701 F. App'x 156
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Rutledge, a longshoreman, lost union and employer sponsorship and Waterfront Commission registration after a 2006 arrest for possession of cocaine (charge later dismissed after diversion).
- He completed rehabilitation and later sought reinstatement under procedures set out in a CBA to which NYSA, ILA, Maher, and Local 1233 are parties; seniority and contract boards denied reinstatement in 2010 and 2013 citing the arrest (and economic conditions).
- Rutledge sued in New Jersey state court asserting five state-law claims (including breach of CBA, breach of duty of fair representation, NJ LAD discrimination, common-law fraud, and tortious interference); defendants removed to federal court arguing § 301 LMRA preemption and the six-month LMRA limitations period.
- The District Court held the breach-of-CBA and hybrid duty-of-fair-representation claims were § 301 actions and dismissed them as time-barred, and it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over three remaining state-law claims, remanding them to state court.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed remand as to the NJ LAD and fraud claims (finding they are not § 301 preempted) but held the tortious-interference claim is preempted by § 301 and must be dismissed as untimely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate review of remand order | Rutledge: remand discretionary under § 1367; not contested on appeal | Appellants: § 1447(d) bars review of remand | Court: § 1447(d) inapplicable because remand rested on § 1367; appellate review permitted under § 1291 and Quackenbush principles — proceed to merits |
| Whether NJ LAD claim is preempted by LMRA § 301 | Rutledge: NJ LAD elements are independent factual questions not requiring CBA interpretation | Appellants: claim depends on CBA procedures and thus is § 301 preempted | Court: NJ LAD claim is not preempted; factual elements do not require interpreting the CBA; remand proper |
| Whether common-law fraud claim is preempted | Rutledge: alleged misrepresentations about reasons for denial are independent torts not requiring CBA interpretation | Appellants: falsity hinges on whether CBA permits cited grounds for denial | Court: fraud claim not preempted; falsity and pretext are factual and do not require interpreting the CBA |
| Whether tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is preempted and timely | Rutledge: interference tort under state law | Appellants: expectation of employment governed by CBA (seniority/reinstatement rules) so claim is § 301 preempted; LMRA limitations bar suit | Court: claim preempted because proving a reasonable expectation requires construing the CBA; dismissed as untimely under LMRA |
Key Cases Cited
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (recognizing § 301 preemption where state-law claim depends on CBA interpretation)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (state anti-discrimination and retaliatory-discharge claims not preempted when resolution does not require CBA interpretation)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (§ 301 preemption of state-law claims founded directly on rights created by CBAs)
- United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (definition of § 301 hybrid suits against employer and union)
- United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (§ 301 provides federal body of law for enforcing CBAs)
- Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217 (3d Cir.) (state tort claims survive if they don't require CBA interpretation)
- Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564 (3d Cir.) (LMRA six-month limitations rule applied to hybrid § 301 suits)
- Pa. Nurses Ass'n v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797 (3d Cir.) (distinguishing remands under § 1447(c) from remands based on § 1367)
- Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (finality principles allowing appellate review of remand orders in certain contexts)