Jeffrey Lovitky v. Donald Trump
918 F.3d 160
| D.C. Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiff Jeffrey Lovitky sued President Donald J. Trump (in his official capacity), seeking mandamus relief to compel amendment of a May 16, 2016 presidential candidate financial-disclosure report filed under the Ethics in Government Act.
- Lovitky alleges the disclosure improperly commingled Trump’s personal liabilities with business liabilities, violating the Act’s requirement to disclose liabilities for which the candidate is personally liable.
- The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing; Lovitky appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
- On appeal the D.C. Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the President is an "officer" under the Mandamus Act and that the alleged obligation was "owed to the plaintiff." The sole question addressed was whether the Mandamus Act covers the duty asserted.
- The court held the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. § 1361) empowers courts to compel only duties that "pertain to" an officer’s public office; obligations arising from a candidate’s pre-election status do not qualify.
- Because Lovitky’s claim attacked duties imposed on a candidate (pre-appointment acts), the court concluded § 1361 did not provide jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1361 authorizes mandamus for duties arising from pre-election/candidate status | Lovitky: § 1361 covers any duty owed by a federal officer, including candidate-reporting obligations under the Ethics in Government Act | Govt: Mandamus reaches only duties tied to an officer’s public office, not pre-appointment/candidate obligations | Held: § 1361 covers duties that flow from the defendant’s public office; candidate duties do not qualify, so no jurisdiction |
| Whether the alleged obligation is a "duty owed to the plaintiff" under § 1361 | Lovitky: The disclosure obligation is owed to the public and to voters/plaintiff, satisfying § 1361 | Govt: Even if framed as owed to plaintiff, the duty must nevertheless pertain to the office to be mandatable | Held: Court assumed duty could be "owed to the plaintiff" but ruled § 1361 still requires office-related duties; claim fails |
| Whether mandamus common-law background supports broad reading of § 1361 | Lovitky: The statute's language is broad and can encompass statutory duties like disclosure | Govt: Common-law mandamus historically compels acts appertaining to office, supporting narrow reading | Held: Common-law mandamus limited relief to duties "resulting from an office, trust, or station," supporting narrow construction |
| Whether substituting an officer in official-capacity suit affects scope of mandamus relief | Lovitky: Not directly addressed as bar to relief | Govt: Forcing successor to perform predecessor’s personal/candidate duties would be incongruous and supports narrow reading | Held: Court noted Rule 25(d) substitution problems as additional reason to limit § 1361 to office-related duties |
Key Cases Cited
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discusses writ of mandamus and its common-law role)
- Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013) (canon: Congress incorporates common-law meaning of terms it uses)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (same principle regarding statutory interpretation)
- Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017) (context informs statutory meaning)
- Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (mandamus issues and office-related duties)
- Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (courts may resolve jurisdictional questions without addressing standing)